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I. Introduction 
An epic number of refugees and migrants are leaving their countries. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees has reported ‘the highest levels of displacement on record,’ with an 
unprecedented 65.3 million people around the world forced from home.1 Millions upon millions 
of these persons – the vast majority, have become displaced internally or have migrated or 
sought refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. A significant 
and growing number of others have embarked on dangerous and complex journeys to reach 
other regions, particularly in Europe, North America and Australia. The movement of people is 
not a new or novel phenomenon; it is a normal response to the will to survive and to prosper, 
fuelled by devastating conflicts, political repression, weak governance, mass human rights 
abuses, economic disenfranchisement, environmental degradation and growing global 
inequality in many parts of the world.  
Regardless of the reason for their journeys, the individuals and families who manage to leave 
their countries of origin are often exhausted, traumatised and in need of humanitarian and 
medical assistance, especially the most vulnerable among them.  
 
A vast proportion of refugees and other migrants experience cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, at times amounting to torture, at all stages of their journey.  
 
A triple syndrome of harm characterises many of their situations:  
 
i) The harm suffered in their home country which was the precursor or one of the 
causes of their departure; 
 
ii) The harm suffered during their arduous journeys to ‘safety’, often passing through 
multiple countries and being subjected to the whims of non-state actors such as 
smugglers, militia and criminal gangs or corrupt governments.  Sometimes 
destination countries have made arrangements with transit countries to detain or 
otherwise prevent individuals from reaching their destination; these arrangements 
have regularly resulted in inhuman conditions and torture, often reaching crisis 
proportions;  
  
iii) The harrowing experiences in the destination country – typically characterised by 
poverty, uncertainty, alienation and discrimination. For the most vulnerable 
individuals fleeing their countries of origin, the mere fact of detention, and the way 
asylum claims are processed and the lack of adequate facilities and basic necessities 
may amount to ill-treatment in its own right. Indefinite detention, poor conditions of 
detention, and various forms of ill-treatment - by guards or fellow inmates or during 
removals, including various forms of sexual and other gender-based violence - are a 
lived reality for many.  
 
This triple syndrome of harm exacerbates vulnerability yet it is rarely acknowledged and even 
more rarely taken into account by the many border guards and other officials who come into 
contact with these marginalised persons.  To the contrary, a combination of abdication of 
responsibility and a positive attempt to make reception conditions difficult so as to discourage 
further movements of people accounts for and exacerbates much of the harm suffered. 
 
                                                             
1 UNHCR website, http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html 
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Even though the main challenge facing those in protection is the absence of channels for safe 
and legal access to protection, receiving States have addressed the crisis by increasing border 
surveillance and reinforcing migration controls, rather than by providing a comprehensive 
humanitarian response. For the most part, receiving states have responded to the increase in 
the number of asylum applicants, and migrants more broadly, not with compassion and respect 
for individuals’ dignity and humanity, but by pursuing technocratic policies of deterrence. The 
measures taken include visa restrictions and carrier sanctions; pushing back people trying to 
enter the territory by land or by sea by building perimeter fences and shutting border crossings; 
financing third states to detain individuals in transit countries and to patrol their borders so 
that they cannot continue their journeys. All these measures are aimed at preventing refugees 
and other migrants from reaching their destination: controlling or managing migration flows 
(managing numbers) or maintaining internal security (managing safety and security threats), 
instead of focusing on the rights of individuals and corresponding obligations of states under 
national and international law.   
 
The deterrence policies are effectuated by broad executive powers; privatisation of many 
aspects of the reception, claims determination, detention and removal processes; limited 
transparency, safeguards and accountability and the lack of effective remedies and reparation. 
The dehumanisation of refugees and other migrants also creates an environment in which 
allegations of ill-treatment based on sexual and/or racial discrimination are rife, though little is 
done in response. 
  
These policies of deterrence are inappropriate and problematic, particularly given their 
incompatibility in practice with states’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Given 
the very foreseeable and grave humanitarian consequences to those policies – including 
widespread, preventable deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and countless refoulements to 
countries where persons face significant risks of persecution, including torture and death, there 
is a need to assess the wider legal consequences of deterrence policies. A laissez-faire approach 
to human suffering when states have a duty to act, engages states’ legal responsibility, in 
addition to their obvious moral responsibilities. 
 
This Report is released by REDRESS on the eve of a summit of world leaders meeting at the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York, on 19 September 2016. They are coming 
together to discuss how to address these challenges, and are set to agree a Global Compact on 
responsibility-sharing relating to refugees. The Summit will be followed by a Leaders’ Summit 
on refugees, hosted by USA President Obama, and focussed on humanitarian funding, 
resettlement quotas, and access to education and employment. These meetings present a crucial 
opportunity to address one of the worst humanitarian crises of our century and to confront a 
virtually broken system of refugee protection. Will the meetings and their follow-up processes 
go far enough? Will racism, xenophobia, and fortress mentalities give way to a new era of 
humanitarianism and collective resolve? The International Community cannot fail; there is too 
much at stake.  
 
This Report analyses these problems through the lens of the incontrovertible obligation of 
states to prevent and respond to torture, and to support the victims of this atrocious crime. Our 
analysis is with a view to (i) identifying the nature and scale of torture and ill-treatment 
experienced by asylum seekers and other migrants at all stages of their “journey”; (ii) examining 
the compatibility of laws and practices with states’ obligations; and (iii) highlighting how 
underlying policies and structural factors create regimes that heighten the risks that those 
seeking entry will be subjected to torture and related abuse.  
 
The Report draws on a range of sources, focusing particularly on several countries that receive 
numerous asylum applications. It also analyses the role played by transit countries and off-
shore processing centres, both in serving the ends of the destination countries, but also in 
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fostering themselves, environments in which individuals regularly face torture and other 
prohibited ill-treatment. These are by no means the only countries whose policies, laws and 
practices raise concerns. However, their approaches, in addition to being problematic in view of 
the extent of the allegations of ill-treatment, have been appropriated by other countries facing 
similar migration challenges.  
 
On the basis of findings made, the Report calls on Summit Leaders, states and relevant 
international and regional organisations, to be bold and to be brave and to demonstrate the 
collective leadership and humanity that is clearly required to address this crisis. The status quo 
is not working. Policies, laws and practices must be revised at all levels to strengthen all 
individuals’ rights not to be tortured.  
 
We hope that the Report will provide a useful resource and tool for analysis, advocacy and 
reforms for those seeking to secure the rights of persons who are frequently made to suffer, 
often repeatedly, simply for the fact of ‘being at the wrong place at the wrong time’.  
 
The report was written by Carla Ferstman and Lutz Oette. REDRESS expresses its appreciation 
to the SOAS, University of London, Human Rights Clinic, and in particular its convenor, 
Professor Lynn Welchman and Aditi Jaganathan, Chiara Petrucci, Claudia Tomarchio, Gemma 
Daly, as well as Emily Hindle for their invaluable research assistance. 
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II. The Securitisation of Refugee 
Protection 
II.1 The Securitisation of Language and the Creation of 
Mythologies 
 
Language has been a key arsenal in the securitisation of refugee protection and migration 
control, and entrenches policy. Language has been used to stir up fear in many destination 
countries about the impact of receiving large numbers of refugees and other migrants. Fear has 
tended to be mobilised through the use of a combination of discriminatory and xenophobic 
stereotypes: 
  
i) The unknown ‘alien’ – focussing on difference; different religion, culture, traditions 
which will infect or negatively impact on the traditions of the host state. Linked to this is 
the wish to dehumanise, the stoking of fears that the unknown ‘alien’ will not be capable 
of or interested in respecting the values of the host state – whether these are religious or 
personal values and beliefs. There is often a fear that accepting large numbers of 
persons from a different faith or culture will upset the natural majority/minority 
balance in the host state, and potentially destabilise that state.  In one notorious and 
extreme example, a Polish magazine published on its front cover a depiction of a white 
woman being accosted and grabbed by three dark-skinned hands, with the headline ‘The 
Islamic rape of Europe.’2  
 
To dehumanise a person or group of persons can be understood as denying their 
individuality and humanity, and excluding them from the moral community to which 
generally agreed notions such as values and fairness apply.3 As a result, the person or 
group of persons concerned becomes stigmatised and is seen as inferior and less 
deserving of respect for his or her dignity and rights. The treatment of Jews and other 
‘undesirable’ people in Nazi Germany who were stripped of their citizenship and other 
rights, subjected to a range of measures designed to signal their supposed inferiority, 
and depicted as dangerous and dirty animals in Nazi propaganda is the starkest example 
of dehumanising a whole people. Migrants and asylum seekers are frequently stripped 
of their individuality and referred to in terms that have derogatory connotations, often 
taken from animal and natural life, such as a ‘swarm’, ‘flood’, ‘invasion’ or ‘epidemic’. In 
the Australian context, a study found that the  
 
… asylum seekers have primarily been represented as medium or large 
groups and through a focus on boats. We argue that this visual framing, 
and in particular the relative absence of images that depict individual 
asylum seekers with recognisable facial features, associates refugees not 
with a humanitarian challenge, but with threats to sovereignty and 
security. These dehumanising visual patterns reinforce a politics of fear 
that explains why refugees are publicly framed as people whose plight, 
dire as it is, nevertheless does not generate a compassionate political 
response.4   
 
                                                             
2 Harriet Sherwood, ‘Polish magazine's “Islamic rape of Europe” cover sparks outrage’, The Guardian, 18 February 2016 
3 Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’, 10(3) (2006) Personality and Social Psychology Review 252 
4 Roland Bleiker et al., ‘The Visual Dehumanisation of Refugees’, (2013) 48(4) Australian Journal of Political Science, 398-416 
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ii) Economics – the usurping ‘alien’ coming to take our jobs; causing a drain on public 
services including housing, health care and schooling.5 
 
iii) Asylum-seeking and Criminality  
 
‘We know irregular migration isn't a crime - not against persons, not against 
property, not against the security of the state. It is a violation of an 
administrative regulation that obliges us to present ourselves at a specific point 
of entry with appropriate papers. But a crime it is not. Refugees and migrants 
who cross borders irregularly do not have the feeling of committing a crime, 
even if they know that what they are doing is not authorised. We don't have the 
moral high ground here: migrants are mostly courageous people who have 
endured a lot, are resilient, and want to do the right thing for themselves and 
their family.’6 
 
Even though the act of seeking asylum is a perfectly legal matter, language has been 
used to label migrants as ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ translating individuals’ desperate search 
for refuge into a quasi-criminal act.7 As highlighted by the Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants in the EU context:  
 
‘The view of migrants among many stakeholders as “illegal” is counterproductive 
and is not based on facts or the provisions of international law. While migrants 
who come to the European Union without documents are in an irregular 
situation (or “undocumented” or “unauthorized”), they have not committed a 
criminal act. The conceptualization of irregular migrants as “illegal” has 
undoubtedly played into the use of immigration detention. It has also had an 
impact on the general public’s perception of migrants, legitimizing policies that 
are not in line with human rights guarantees and contributing to xenophobia and 
discrimination.’8 
 
As legal immigration has in most countries become increasingly difficult for non-
privileged persons due to restrictive policies, migrants, even where they do not fall 
within the definition of refugee under international law, are often faced with a choice of 
entering and remaining in a country illegally or applying for asylum – the notion of the 
‘bogus refugee’. This development risks that the notion of “refugee” and the system of 
refugee protection is questioned, where it is equated with attempts to bypass 
immigration rules; these individuals are positioned as rule-breakers, untrustworthy, 
criminal.   
 
Host states are responsible for closing their borders, which is a direct cause of 
bourgeoning smugglers and trafficking networks; ‘ criminalisation drives all irregular 
migrants further underground, into the hands of smugglers and exploitative employers 
and landlords. If the host states' objective is effectively to control borders, such 
criminalisation is counterproductive, since it entrenches mobile, creative, and tech-
savvy smuggling rings that take over the control of cross-border movements of 
                                                             
5 Patson Muzuwa, a torture survivor and refugee from Zimbabwe explains: ‘I am deeply embarrassed when I meet people who think 
asylum seekers like me are just people who need some money. I’m not here to study, I’m not here to make a fortune , I’m not in this 
country to steal any benefits from anyone, I pay my own taxes. I want to be seen as a refugee and not as a thief.’ REDRESS, Torture: 
Stories of Survival, June 2005, 31 
6 François Crépeau, ‘Rejecting Criminalisation and Externalisation: Moving from Enforced Closure to Regulated Mobility’ (2015) 104 
Geo LJ Online 115, 120 
7 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization means for Migration and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 
8 François Crépeau , ‘Banking on mobility over a generation: follow-up to the regional study on the management of the external 
borders of the European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human 
rights of migrants, François Crépeau, UN Doc A/HRC/29/36, 8 May 2015, para. 72 
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persons.’9 At the same time, states’ focus on the criminalisation of smugglers – is 
appropriate yet it is also part of the politics of deflecting blame away from the 
governments who have failed to establish safe routes through which individuals seeking 
protection can have their claims assessed. Furthermore, economic migration is not a sin 
or a crime – it is a necessary bi-product of global fiscal policies and interconnected 
economies. The desire/need to seek out opportunities is natural and must be seen in its 
historical context over many generations.   
 
The systematic policies to detain irregular migrants and refugees are also a form of 
criminalisation. As Crépeau has explained, ‘administrative detention has increased 
exponentially, without effective oversight mechanisms that could address the issues 
relating to the criteria for, duration of, and conditions of detention. The idea of detention 
as a last resort, only if absolutely necessary, is applied almost nowhere, and alternatives 
to detention haven't been seriously developed in any country I've visited.’10  
 
iv) The influx of persons will increase the pressure on policing and security making it 
difficult to deter undesirable or dangerous persons heightening the prospects of 
terrorism. Instead of emphasising the legal and moral imperative to protect vulnerable 
persons, the paradigm shifts to the need to protect national security interests above 
any other interests. For instance, this underpins Australia’s approach. In response to the 
number of asylum seekers, mainly from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Sri Lanka, seeking to 
reach its territory by boat, Australia introduced a policy known as “Pacific Solution”11 in 
2001. This controversial policy was ended in 2007 but effectively revived in September 
2013 with the introduction of “Operation Sovereign Borders.” This 2013 policy treats 
asylum seekers and other migrants as a threat to Australia’s national security.  
Operation Sovereign Borders is a military-led operation. Similarly, NATO warships have 
been used in the Aegean Sea to stop the flow of refugees to Europe in an operation 
designed to counter human trafficking and criminal networks, but undoubtedly also 
having the effect of preventing refugees from reaching safety in Europe. 
 
v) The scale of current migration levels have been termed ‘unprecedented’, a ‘crisis’.  
Emphasising the tremendous scale of the issue tends to be a precursor for 
governments and other policy makers to explain why exceptions are needed; why the 
law as it stands cannot and should not be applied.   The claim is often made that a mass 
influx of refugees will threaten the security (even the very survival) of the state. States 
have diverged from their obligations not to refoule refugees when they consider it 
necessary or in their interest to do so, often explaining their actions in terms of the 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
These fears have not only helped to underpin many governments’ policies of deterrence; they 
have also sparked racism and xenophobia which is already having a deleterious impact on 
community cohesion and with major boosts to both the nationalistic and exceptionalist internal 
and foreign policies of many countries, far beyond the areas of asylum and migration.   
 
Dehumanisation, whether intended or resulting from the portrayal of migrants and asylum 
seekers, also increases individuals’ vulnerability to hate crimes in the destination country, such 
as attacks on shelters housing asylum seekers, beatings and attacks of visible minorities and 
inflammatory graffiti. It also creates an environment in which the potential for torture and other 
                                                             
9 François Crépeau, ‘Rejecting Criminalisation and Externalisation: Moving from Enforced Closure to Regulated Mobility’ (2015) 104 
Geo LJ Online 115, 117 
10 Ibid, 116-7 
11 See further Janet Philip, The ‘Pacific Solution’ revisited: a statistical guide to the asylum seeker caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island, 
Parliament of Australia, 4 September 2012, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/1893669/upload_binary/1893669.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf  
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forms of ill-treatment by public officials is increased. By seeing these persons as a threat or as 
undeserving and unwelcome, dehumanisation lowers the threshold for ill-treatment for those 
exercising power over migrants and asylum seekers. At the same time, migrants and asylum 
seekers often have a precarious legal status, are in a vulnerable situation and may not be in a 
position to effectively respond to threats or intimidation, which limits the likelihood that they 
will take action against abuse. This serves to silence them and is likely to result in, or perpetuate 
any impunity for torture.  In addition, the fact that asylum seekers do not have rights of political 
participation frequently means that they will enjoy limited political support, which risks  further 
weakening their position, including any calls to strengthen their rights and to provide better 
systems of protection. 
 
Grassroots citizens’ movements in receiving countries and certain refugee-friendly 
governments such as those in place in Canada and Germany have sought to counteract the 
tendencies towards dehumanisation. The adoption of the slogan ‘Refugees are Welcome Here’12 
has been an important rallying point but more than slogans are required to stem the tide of 
xenophobia and to improve respect for the rights of those concerned.  
 
The underlying policies and sentiments in many countries remain hostile to admitting a 
substantial number of asylum seekers and/or other migrants.  
 
II.2 Law, Exceptionalism and National Security 
 
Refugee law is designed to ensure that persons with a well-founded fear of persecution can 
safely claim and obtain refuge. But national security considerations have become increasingly 
important rationales to justify limitations on the recognition of persons as refugees and to 
minimise the protections offered to recognised refugees. In this section we explore how certain 
facets of the legal framework have been manipulated and exclusion clauses interpreted in 
overly broad ways to bar entry and/or to deny protection or expulse persons who should 
otherwise be entitled to protection. We also explore how other rules (mass movements; 
temporary protection) have been impacted by national security paradigms to the detriment of 
those seeking protection.  
 
The refugee law framework is an essentially humanitarian framework designed to afford 
protection to those in need. It was never designed to apply to serious criminals, terrorists or 
others who pose a significant risk to the host country. Exceptionalism has been built in to the 
refugee law framework in several ways:  
 
II.2.1 Exclusions and National Security Paradigms 
 
The Refugee Convention has a number of exclusion clauses which are designed to ensure that 
persons who violate the rights of others or commit serious crimes do not benefit from 
protection and cannot ‘abuse the institution of asylum in order to avoid being held legally 
accountable for their acts.’13 The Convention denies international protection to persons who 
would otherwise qualify as refugees if they fall within certain parameters.  Under Article 1(f) of 
the Convention, refugee status does not apply to any person with respect to whom there are 
serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, 
or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside 
                                                             
12 See e.g., Emma Graham-Harrison and Lizzy Davis, ‘Refugees are Welcome Here: UK marchers take to streets with message of 
support’, Guardian, 12 September 2015 
13 Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees, UN Doc HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003, 2 
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the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty 
of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. A similar provision is 
found in Article I(5) of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa.14  
 
The wording of Article 1F makes clear that the exclusion clauses apply not only to  persons who 
have been convicted of crimes coming within the three sub-clauses, but also to persons against 
whom ‘there are serious reasons for considering’ that they may have committed those offences. 
There is a legitimate concern to ensure that the international refugee system is not abused by 
persons who are not deserving of protection, and hence the inclusion in the clauses of persons 
who have not been convicted of any crime. At the same time, however, it is important that the 
exclusion clauses do not become a route for states to arbitrarily deny access to international 
protection. Bona fide asylum-seekers should not be victimised by unduly broad legislative or 
administrative measures, designed to deter entry.  
 
The jurisprudence has been relatively clear that the exclusion clauses must be restrictively 
interpreted and cautiously applied and there must be some objective basis for the belief of the 
person’s individual responsibility for the crime.15 In this same sense, UNHCR has underscored 
that individual determinations are necessary; it is not enough for instance, to ‘rely on the 
designation as “terrorist” of a particular crime, person or group. Rather than focusing on the 
label, it is necessary to determine whether the acts in question constitute crimes within the 
scope of article 1F;’16  
 
where there is sufficient proof that an asylum-seeker belongs to an extremist group 
involved in the commission of serious crimes, including those considered to be of a 
terrorist nature, the information available about this group may support a finding that 
anyone who voluntarily becomes, or remains, a member may be considered to have 
incurred individual responsibility for the crimes in question. In asylum procedures, this 
may give rise to a rebuttable presumption of individual liability in such cases, resulting 
in the burden of proof shifting to the asylum-seeker. The position of the individual in the 
organization concerned, including the voluntariness of his or her membership, as well as 
the fragmentation of certain groups would nevertheless be examined and taken into 
account in reaching a determination on exclusion.17  
 
Despite these cautions, there is significant contingency in the application. The crime of 
terrorism, which can fall within the exclusion clauses, has no internationally accepted definition. 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, many states introduced overly 
broad framings of the definition which can leave the Refugee Convention’s exclusion clause 
open to abuse. The adoption in November 2002 of Security Council Resolution 1377, which 
obliged Member States to take a range of measures to counter terrorism, called upon states to 
ensure that asylum-seekers that have planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of 
terrorist acts are not granted refugee status and that refugee status is not abused by 
perpetrators, organisers or facilitators of terrorist acts. It also set out that acts of international 
terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, putting terrorism 
squarely within exclusion (c), yet the absence of a definition makes this prone to abuse.   
 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has indicated that  
 
                                                             
14 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Organization of African Unity (OAU) (adopted 10 
September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974) 1001 UNTS 45 
15 See, e.g., Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] 2 SCR 100, para 114; Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54 para 75 
16 UNHCR, Addressing Security Concerns without Undermining Refugee Protection - UNHCR’s perspective – Rev 2, 17 Dec 2015, para 23 
17 Ibid, para 24  
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In the international community’s efforts to combat acts of terrorism it is important that 
unwarranted associations between terrorists and refugees/asylum-seekers are avoided. 
Moreover, definitions of terrorist crimes adopted on the international, regional and 
national level will need to be extremely precise to ensure that the “terrorist” label is not 
abused for political ends, for example to prohibit the legitimate activities of political 
opponents. Such definitions may influence the interpretation of the exclusion clauses 
and, if distorted for political ends, could lead to the improper exclusion of certain 
individuals. Indeed, unwarranted applications of the “terrorist” label could trigger 
recriminations amounting to persecution against an individual.18  
 
The EU’s Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the qualifications and status of third 
country nationals and stateless persons as concerns connected to the potential violation of the 
European Court of Human Rights (Qualification Directive) was originally adopted in 200419 and 
recast in 2011.20 It covers the criteria for being awarded international protection, and also the 
rights of recognised refugees as well as beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Similar to Article 
1F of the Refugee Convention, the 2004 Qualification Directive sets out reasons in which states 
may exclude persons from refugee status because the crimes they have committed are so 
serious that they do not deserve protection. The provisions on exclusion in Article 12 of the 
2004 Directive went beyond the exhaustive criteria set out in the Refugee Protection, and thus a 
wider category of persons who would otherwise benefit from protection under the Refugee 
Convention are excluded. It adds language requiring the exclusion of those who “instigate or 
otherwise participate in” the types of crimes referenced in the article,21 which can potentially 
lead states to exclude persons who lacked the intent to commit such crimes and thus could not 
be deemed individually responsible under international criminal law.22 The recast 2011 
Directive has only slightly amended this wording – using ‘incite’ instead of ‘instigate’23 however 
it is not clear what difference the change in wording has made. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union has clarified in the case of B and D, that neither the mere fact of an individual’s 
membership in a terrorist group included on a list, nor the individual’s intentional participation 
in the activities of a terrorist group, are in and of themselves sufficient to exclude automatically 
an applicant from refugee status.24  
 
II.2.2 Recognised refugees – exceptions to the obligation to avoid 
expulsions and refoulement  
 
The Refugee Convention also prevents expulsions and refoulement of persons who have already 
been determined to be refugees, safe for a few exceptions. Article 32 of the Convention prevents 
the expulsion of recognised refugees except ‘on grounds of national security or public order’.25  
Article 33(2) of the Convention prevents refoulement except of persons  ‘whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he [or she] 
is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.’ A similar exception exists in the 1966 
Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees, adopted by the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee,26 which provides in Article III(3) that ‘No one seeking asylum in accordance with 
                                                             
18 UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Department of International Protection (DIP); Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section, 4 September 2003, para 84 
19 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 Apr 2004, OJ 30 Sept 2004, L 304/12.23 
20 Recast Qualification Directive, Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 
21 Article 12(3) of the 2004 Qualification Directive 
22 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, Germany v. B and Germany v. D, 9 November 2010   
23 Paragraph 12(3) of the 2011 Recast Qualification Directive 
24 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, Germany v. B and Germany v. D, 9 November 2010   
25 Art 32(1); 33(2) 
26 Report of the Eighth Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee held in Bangkok, 8–17 Aug. 1966, p. 335 
(hereinafter ‘Asian-African Refugee Principles’) 
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these Principles should, except for overriding reasons of national security or safeguarding the 
populations, be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion.’ 
 
These exceptions – to the fundamental prohibition against expulsion and refoulement of 
refugees, respectively – are grave in their consequences and the threshold for their application 
is uniformly recognised to be high. Despite this, UNHCR has expressed concern that ‘States may 
be inclined to expel groups or individuals based on religious, ethnic or national origin or 
political affiliation, on the mere assumption that they may be involved in terrorism’ and has 
underscored that article 33(2) requires that it is established in the individual case that the 
person constitutes a danger to the security or the community of the country of refuge.27 
 
Concerns have been expressed that Article 14 of the EU Qualification Directive, which provides 
that Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew refugee status in certain circumstances, 
extends the grounds for exclusion beyond what is permitted by the Refugee Convention. Article 
14(4) refers to reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to the security of the 
Member State or if, having been convicted by final judgment of a particularly serious crime, they 
are a danger to the community. Article 14(5) permits Member States to apply Article 14(4) 
before a decision on the asylum claim has been made. These two provisions effectively allow 
refugee status to be denied (as a de facto form of exclusion) on security grounds and therefore 
for reasons that go beyond the (exhaustive) exclusion criteria set out in Article 1 (F) of the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Under the Refugee Convention, security grounds are captured in Article 
33(2) in relation to expulsion, not Article 1F which concerns acts which predate the individual’s 
entry to the host country. UNHCR has noted, in relation to Article 14 of the EU Qualification 
Directive that the provisions ‘run the risk of introducing substantive modifications to the 
exclusion clauses of the 1951Convention.’28 
 
II.2.3 The absolute prohibition of torture as a form of added 
protection 
 
In refugee law, the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment is typically considered at two 
critical junctures in the asylum process: as an act of persecution in refugee status determination 
under article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) 
and in the context of non-refoulement, i.e. the prohibition of sending someone to a country 
where he or she is at risk of persecution.29 International human rights law, in contrast, applies at 
all stages of the asylum-seeking process as any person regardless of their citizenship status has 
the right to be free from torture and other prohibited ill-treatment.30 Any state under whose 
jurisdiction a person falls, be it by virtue of being on its territory or under its effective control, 
has a corresponding duty to meet its obligations under the international prohibition of 
torture.31 This includes countries of origin, transit and destination.  
                                                             
27 UNHCR, Addressing Security Concerns without Undermining Refugee Protection - UNHCR’s perspective – Rev 1, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2011/docs/unhcr-security-refugee-protection.pdf, para 21 
28 UNHCR, Comments on the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection and the content of the protection granted (COM(2009)551, 21 October 2009), p 13 
29 See Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention of 1951: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ 
30 Art 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture; Art 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UN Human 
Rights Committee has clarified in its General Comment N° 20 (1992) that states have an obligation not to expose individuals to ‘the 
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their 
extradition, expulsion or refoulement.’ According to General Comment N° 31, Article 2 of the Covenant also entails an obligation on 
states ‘not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm… either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to 
which the person may subsequently be removed.’ 
31 Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by states parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2, 24 
January 2008, paras. 7, 16 
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There will be instances in which an exclusion clause applies to an individual pursuant to Article 
1F of the Refugee Convention with the consequence that the person will not be recognised as a 
refugee, or where the exceptions to expulsion or refoulement apply in accordance with Articles 
32(1) or 33(2) of that Convention, but nevertheless the person will be entitled to remain in the 
host state, because of operable residual human rights protections. The application of both these 
provisions is subject to a state’s other obligations under human rights treaties which make clear 
that it is not possible to expel or refoule a person to a country where they face a real risk of 
torture or relate abuses.  Human rights law allows for no derogations in this regard. 
 
However, this has not prevented states from seeking to limit the application of human rights law 
to expulsion and refoulement cases which involve national security considerations, and a 
number of courts have struggled under this weight to maintain the absolute prohibition of 
refoulement when there is a real risk of torture. The absolute prohibition of torture allows for 
no balancing of the risk of torture against national security risks. If a state deports a person 
when the requirements in Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention are met, it will still be a 
violation of the absolute prohibition of torture if there are substantial grounds for believing 
there will be torture on return. Despite this, the Canadian Supreme Court indicated in the Suresh 
case, that it was possible to expel a person who faced a real risk of torture, if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a threat to national security of the country of 
refuge.  The Supreme Court understood that in deciding a specific case, a balancing test must be 
carried out. If the risk the person in question imposes to Canada weighs more than the 
consequence of deporting the person, then Canada can deport a person even if there are 
substantial grounds to believe the person might be subject to torture on return.32 The UN 
Committee Against Torture noted as a subject of concern, ‘[t]he failure of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, to recognize at the level of domestic 
law the absolute nature of the protection of article 3 of the Convention, which is not subject to 
any exception whatsoever.’33 The New Zealand Supreme Court came to a different conclusion,34 
and determined that there should be no balancing or weighing of the threat posed with the 
rights to be free from torture.35 It held that ‘…, in deciding whether to certify … that the 
continued presence of a person constitutes a threat to national security, and …, in deciding 
whether to advise the Governor-General to order deportation … , are not to so decide or advise 
if they are satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a result of the 
deportation, the person would be in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or of being 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’36 
 
Some EU Member States have similarly sought to limit the extraterritorial nature of the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment to minimise its impact on expulsion cases.37 This 
approach was rejected by the European Court of Human Rights38 and UN treaty bodies.39  In 
Saadi, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights made clear: 
                                                             
32 See also, Ahani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 72, para 22 
33 UNCAT, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under article 19 of the convention, Conclusions and 
recommendations of the Committee against Torture (Canada), CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 7 July 2005, para 4(a)  
34 Attorney-General v. Zaoui and Ors (Zaoui No. 2) [2005] NZSC 38, New Zealand: Supreme Court, 21 June 2005, para 93 
35 Ibid, Para 42 
36 Ibid, para 93 
37 UK Government, New Vision for Refugees, 7 March 2010, 9, para. 3.3 (emphasis added), available at: 
http://archiv.proasyl.de/texte/europe/union/2003/UK_NewVision.pdf. See also, Observation of the Governments of Lithuania, 
Portugal, Slovakia and the United Kingdom Intervening in ECtHR, Application No 25424/05 Ramzy v the Netherlands (2005); Saadi v. 
Italy (Grand Chamber), Appl no 37201/06, 28 February 2008, para 122 
38 Chahal v United Kingdom ECtHR, Appl No 22414/93, 15 November 1996, para. 79 et seq.; Ahmed v Austria, Appl No 25694/9617, 
December 1996, para. 40 seq.;  H.L.R. v France, Appl no 24573/94, 29 April 1997, para. 35; Saadi v Italy, Appl No 37201/06, 28 
February 2008, para. 127; Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, Appl No 8319/0728, June 2011, para. 212  The Ahmed v Austria and 
Chahal v. UK cases make clear that expulsion is not permitted if there is a real risk of torture, even though Article 33(2) of the 
Refugee Convention may legitimately apply; the torture prohibition overrides.   
39 See also Committee Against Torture, Gorki Ernesto Tapia Paez v. Sweden, UN Doc CAT/C/18/D/39/1996, 28 April 1997, para 14.5 
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138. Accordingly, the Court cannot accept the argument of the United Kingdom 
Government, supported by the Government, that a distinction must be drawn under 
Article 3 between treatment inflicted directly by a signatory state and treatment that 
might be inflicted by the authorities of another state, and that protection against this 
latter form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the interests of the community as 
a whole (see paragraphs 120 and 122 above). Since protection against the treatment 
prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite 
or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being 
subjected to such treatment. As the Court has repeatedly held, there can be no 
derogation from that rule (see the case-law cited in paragraph 127 above). It must 
therefore reaffirm the principle stated in Chahal (cited above, § 81) that it is not possible 
to weigh the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion in 
order to determine whether the responsibility of a state is engaged under Article 3, even 
where such treatment is inflicted by another state. In that connection, the conduct of the 
person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account, 
with the consequence that the protection afforded by Article 3 is broader than that 
provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (see Chahal, cited above, § 80, and paragraph 63 above). Moreover, 
that conclusion is in line with points IV and XII of the guidelines of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight against terrorism (see 
paragraph 64 above). 
139. The Court considers that the argument based on the balancing of the risk of harm if 
the person is sent back against the dangerousness he or she represents to the 
community if not sent back is misconceived. The concepts of “risk” and “dangerousness” 
in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing test because they are notions that 
can only be assessed independently of each other. Either the evidence adduced before 
the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk if the person is sent back or it does not. 
The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does 
not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill-treatment that the person may be subject 
to on return. For that reason it would be incorrect to require a higher standard of proof, 
as submitted by the intervener, where the person is considered to represent a serious 
danger to the community, since assessment of the level of risk is independent of such a 
test.40 
States have also sought to limit or mitigate the risk of torture or other ill-treatment by 
negotiating diplomatic assurances with the receiving states in expulsion and deportation cases. 
This follows the longstanding practice of states which do not recognise the death penalty 
negotiating assurances in extradition cases that the death penalty will not be carried out. 
However, the sufficiency of assurances to guarantee that an individual will be adequately 
protected against ill-treatment is less clear-cut than in extradition cases where the person 
subject to the extradition warrant faces a potential death sentence. As noted by UNHCR, in death 
penalty cases (unlike torture cases), ‘the wanted person is transferred to a formal process, and 
the requesting state’s compliance with the assurances can be monitored. While there is no 
effective remedy for the requested state or the surrendered person if the assurances are not 
observed, non-compliance can be readily identified and would need to be taken into account 
when evaluating the reliability of such assurances in any future cases.’41 In torture cases, there 
is a usual lack of monitoring mechanisms or mechanism for the enforcement of the assurances 
post expulsion or deportation, nor is there any legal remedy for the sending state or the 
individual concerned in case of non-compliance, once the person has been transferred to the 
                                                             
40 Saadi v. Italy (Grand Chamber), Appl no 37201/06, 28 February 2008  
41 UNHCR, ‘Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection’, August 2006, para 22 
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receiving state.42 The European Court of Human Rights has refrained from saying that 
diplomatic assurances are per se, an insufficient means to mitigate a real risk of torture.43 
However, the bulk of international experts canvassing this issue have shown extreme reticence 
about the potential for such assurances to adequately minimise the risk of torture. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture has noted that, in light of the risks, diplomatic assurances should 
never be resorted to in circumstances where there is a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights, or of systematic practice of torture.44 In a later report, the 
Special Rapporteur has made clear that post-return mechanisms do little to mitigate the risk of 
torture and have proven ineffective in both safeguarding against torture and as a mechanism of 
accountability.45 This is consistent with the views of many human rights organisations. For 
example, Amnesty International has called ‘on the member states of the European Union (EU) 
and the Council of Europe to reject unequivocally the failed experiment of accepting unreliable, 
unenforceable promises of humane treatment from governments that torture and to recommit 
to comply with their absolute obligation not to send persons, no matter what their alleged crime 
or status, to places where they are at risk of torture and other ill-treatment. It is abundantly 
clear that promises of humane treatment in such circumstances simply cannot be trusted and 
they should no longer be used by European governments in an attempt to re-brand returns to 
the risk of torture as “human rights friendly” measures.’46 
 
Even when an individual manages to avoid expulsion or deportation by virtue of the operation 
of the absolute prohibition of torture, the status that person will have in the host state may be 
limited and is largely unregulated. They may not benefit from refugee status and all the rights 
that this may entail. They will have only limited rights to shelter and assistance. Given that 
Articles 1F, 32(1) and 33(2) apply to persons against whom there is credible evidence of 
wrongdoing but not necessarily a conviction for the offensive conduct, and given that the vast 
majority will not be prosecuted in the host state, they carry the weight of the suspicion 
nonetheless and exist in a state of limbo.    
  
                                                             
42 Agiza v. Sweden, Comm No 233/2003, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 20 May 2005; Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, Comm No 
1416/2005, UN Doc CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, 10 November 2006 
43 See, e.g., Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Appl No 8139/09, 17 January 2012 
44 Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Report submitted pursuant to 
General Assembly resolution 58/164, UN Doc A/59/324, 1 September 2004, para 37 
45 Special Rapporteur on Torture, Report submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 59/182, UN Doc A/60/316, 30 
August 2005, para 46 
46 Amnesty International, ‘Dangerous Deals: Europe's reliance on "diplomatic assurances" against torture’, AI Index: EUR 
01/012/2010, April 2010, 7 
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III. Mass refugee influxes 
 
The challenges associated with mass refugee influxes have led to numerous arguments about 
the need to adapt, limit or exempt from the fundamental principles relating to non-refoulement 
(which is non-derogable). There are several arguments which have been put forward to justify a 
rewriting of the rules: 
 
1. The principle of non-refoulement does not apply to mass influx situations 
 
Is the principle of non-refoulement a non-derogable obligation even in cases of mass influx? The 
Refugee Convention contains no explicit exception for states to derogate from the principle of 
non-refoulement in cases of mass influx. Yet, the flight from generalised forms of violence in the 
context of war is not one of the grounds of persecution specifically recognised in the Refugee 
Convention.47 This is different than the wider grounds set out in the OAU Convention,48 which 
also recognises that the status of refugee ‘shall also apply to every person who, owing to 
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order 
in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place 
of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality’49 or the Cartagena Declaration,50 which also recognises as refugees ‘persons who 
have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by 
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or 
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’.51 States outside these regions 
have generally not adopted these wider notions.  
 
Nonetheless, the issue is not solely one of the breadth of the Refugee Convention. Many persons 
who flee conflict as part of a mass flight may have fears of persecution which fall squarely 
within the Refugee Convention. The challenge is that as a result of the mass influx, few states 
have the willingness and capacity to individually assess each entrant to determine the reasons 
for their flight.  But, as Durieux and McAdam set out, ‘to assert that the Convention does not 
apply in cases of mass influx is tantamount to saying that the individual and his or her rights is 
absent when that individual is part of a mass group.’52 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem have 
similarly explained that ‘[t]he words of Article 33(1) give no reason to exclude the application of 
the principle to situations of mass influx. On the contrary, read in the light of the humanitarian 
object of the treaty and the fundamental character of the principle, the principle must apply 
unless its application is clearly excluded.’53 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem also refer to the OAU 
Refugee Convention,54 the Cartagena Declaration55 and the proposal for an EU Council Directive 
                                                             
47 Art 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention read together with the 1967 Protocol  recognises as a refugee a person with a ‘well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it…’  
48 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Organization of African Unity (OAU) (adopted 10 
September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974) 1001 UNTS 45 
49 Ibid, Art 1(2) 
50 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, 
Mexico and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 22 November 1984 
51 Ibid, III(3) 
52 Jean-Francois Durieux and Jane McAdam, ‘Non-Refoulement  through Time: The Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee 
Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies’ (2004) 16 Intl J Refugee L 4, 9 
53 Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion’, in Erika Feller, 
Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds) Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International 
Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) paras 103-4 
54 OAU, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Art II(3) 
55 OAS, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Conclusion III(5) 
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on Temporary Protection56 all of which recognise the fundamental character of non-
refoulement.57 
 
2. Temporary recognition of refugee status does not confirm refugee status, so non-
refoulement does not apply 
 
While host states may apply different standards in contexts of mass refugee influxes to 
determine whether persons may be entitled to stay (use of prima facie determinations), there is 
no indication that persons which have received such determinations benefit from less rights on 
entry. Prima facie status simply raises a presumption that the individual members of the group 
are refugees, who can accordingly benefit from international protection and assistance. It is 
conclusive of refugee status, unless the state decides to subject the person to scrutiny on an 
individual basis, and finds against the individual asylum seeker.58 
 
3. The presumption of durable solution does not apply to mass influx situations 
 
When an individual is recognised as a refugee, there is an obligation on the receiving state to 
ensure that the person benefits from a durable solution, whether it consists of voluntary 
repatriation, local integration or resettlement. The argument is that this obligation to find a 
durable solution does not apply to individuals who arrive as part of a mass influx. Yet the 
political failure of states to work in coordination to find and take the necessary measures to 
adopt such solutions does not mean that they have no obligation to find such solutions.59 Not 
only do the obligations continue to apply as a matter of law, there are cogent humanitarian 
reasons why durable solutions are vital. An absence of durable solutions intensifies refugees’ 
vulnerability and risks of exploitation and increases long-term dependency on humanitarian 
support. Inside refugee camps and enclosed immigration detention settings, refugees are 
vulnerable to physical violence, torture, sexual assault and rape. The vulnerability, 
insecurity and lack of safe options can lead refugees to resort to dangerous and at times life-
threatening courses of conduct such as use of smugglers and traffickers, or returning to the 
unsafe conflict zones from which they fled. In certain circumstances, the failure to afford a 
durable solution may amount to a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. If it a cause 
for an involuntary return, it may also constitute a form of refoulement. It is thus difficult to 
easily separate out the fundamental non-refoulement obligation from the host of other 
obligations incumbent on states in accordance with the Refugee Convention.  It has been argued 
that setting up some kind of derogation system would better protect refugees in a mass influx 
situation, given the tendency of many states to simply ignore many of the obligations in the 
Refugee Convention.60  This may not be prudent, given the interrelationship between the 
different Convention rights.  
  
                                                             
56 Council Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, 
2001/55/EC, 20 July 2001, Article 6(2)  
57 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (n. 53), paras. 107-8 
58 Discussed in Durieux and McAdam (n. 52), 12-13 
59 Ibid, 13 
60 Ibid, 18-23 
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IV. The Trajectory of Harm 
 
IV.1 Taking flight – the precursors 
 
There is a view popularised in certain media outlets that those leaving their countries of origin 
have some kind of choice. The reality is quite different. Most have found the transition out of 
their countries extremely difficult, miss the support structures and would return if they could. 
As M. Singh who comes from Punjab says, ‘I miss my family who are still in India and I’m not 
coping myself so I couldn’t have a family of my own. It’s hard because back in India I was a local 
priest, people respected me, here I’m by myself, I have no one.’61  
 
Millions are fleeing simply because they wish to survive; something which has become an 
impossible prospect in their home countries. As one academic indicated in respect of Burmese 
refugees, ‘[t]he Rohingya are faced with two options: stay and face annihilation, or flee.’62 
Individuals are fleeing intractable and devastating conflicts, sectarianism and fundamentalism, 
indiscriminate bombings, laying siege to villages hindering access to water and food, 
persecution, rapes, lashings and extrajudicial executions. They have a fear for their continued 
safety, which prompts their flight. Sometimes they leave because state institutions have 
collapsed and they fear that their governments cannot protect them from the acts of rebel 
movements, criminal gangs or other non-state actors. Many have been victims of or witnessed 
multiple acts of violence including torture, which can produce lasting psychological impacts.  
 
Eritrea, one of the largest refugee producing countries in Africa has been described by the UN as 
a place where ‘Eritreans continue to be subjected to indefinite national service, arbitrary 
detention, torture, enforced disappearances, reprisals for the alleged conduct of family 
members, discrimination on religious and ethnic grounds, sexual and gender-based violence, 
and killings.’63 It determined amongst other things that ‘the use of torture by Eritrean officials 
has been, and remains, both widespread and systematic in civilian and military detention 
centres.’64 
 
An assessment of Syrian refugees in Jordan revealed that as a result of their experiences 26% 
felt ‘so hopeless they did not want to carry on living’ and almost 19% felt ‘unable to carry out 
essential activities for daily living because of feelings of fear, anger, fatigue, disinterest, 
hopelessness, or upset.’65 A recent study by the German chamber of psychotherapists found 
similarly.66 The study determined that at least half of the refugees in Germany suffered from 
psychological problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder or depression. 40% have had 
suicidal thoughts or have tried to kill themselves.  The study refers by way of example to the 
plight of Yezidi women who escaped from captivity of the Islamic State, who experienced during 
their flight to Germany flashbacks and panic attacks with palpitations, shortness of breath, 
dizziness and fear of death. The narrowness of the plane sparked memories of the captivity.  
 
 
                                                             
61 REDRESS, Torture: Stories of Survival, June 2005, 11 
62 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Burma’s boatpeople “faced choice of annihilation or risking their lives at sea”’, The Observer, 17 May 
2015 
63 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea’, UN Doc A/HRC/32/47, 9 May 2016, 
para 29  
64 Ibid, para 39 
65 L. James, et al. ‘The Mental Health of Syrian Refugee Children and Adolescents’ (2014) 47 Forced Migration Review 42-44 
66 See, ‘Mindestens die Hälfte der Flüchtlinge ist psychisch krank‘, BPtK-Standpunkt Psychische Erkrankungen bei Flüchtlingen, 16 
September 2015, http://www.bptk.de/aktuell/einzelseite/artikel/mindestens-d.html 
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IV.2 In transit – perilous journeys 
 
When refugees leave their homes, they can face extreme dangers.  Many refugees leave their 
homes suddenly and are able to take very few if any of their possessions with them. Sometimes 
they face many days, weeks or even months or years of travel, with little food, medicines, lack of 
shelter and appropriate clothing and are in fear for their lives. The elderly, disabled persons and 
young children suffer particularly given the harsh conditions. Refugees become walking targets 
for armed gangs and marauders who rob them of their few last possessions and bribe them to 
secure safe passage.  Young boys can be susceptible to kidnap and forced to fight for armed 
groups; women and girls are regularly subjected to rape.  
 
Displaced internally and in neighbouring countries 
 
Most persons forced to leave their homes have the intention of returning. They may move to 
other parts of their home country they perceive as safer or to neighbouring countries where 
they may have friends or relatives, or which may be easiest for them to access. UNHCR has 
determined that ‘the majority of refugees were able to find asylum in neighbouring countries. Of 
the 10.1 million refugees from the five highest countries of origin, all but 1.1 million (11%) 
found safety in a neighbouring country. This is the case for most of the refugee populations of 
concern to UNHCR.’67 In 2015, 86% of the world’s refugees were being hosted by developing 
countries; the least developed countries hosted 26% of the world’s refugees.68 Neighbouring 
host states face a significant challenge to cope with large influxes of refugees, particularly when 
the reasons for the displacement are protracted. 
 
Many of these refugees are hosted in makeshift camps, often for years and sometimes decades 
and even generations. The situation in camps can be devastating. There is often inadequate 
food, medicine and protection from the cold. Because some of the host countries do not 
recognise refugee status or offer the possibility of local integration, the inhabitants await an 
answer on resettlement to another country, which can take years and does not always come. 
There are not always educational opportunities in the camps which can be devastating for 
children refugees who remain idle, together with their idle families who cannot work and are 
wholly dependent on humanitarian aid.  Safety in camps can also be problematic, with 
generalised violence being rife, endemic sexual violence, and in some cases armed factions and 
criminal gangs being allowed to operate.69  
 
One volunteer serving at the Softex camp [in Greece], which holds 1,400 mostly Syrian 
refugees, alleged that some young girls had been effectively groomed by male gangs. He 
said an Iraqi family had to be moved to emergency accommodation outside the camp 
after their daughter was attacked. 
 
“The parents are still in disbelief over what happened. A man from one of the ‘mafia’ 
groups asked their seven-year-old daughter into their tent to play games on his phone 
and then zipped up the tent. She came back with marks on her arms and neck. Later the 
girl described how she was sexually abused. It has scarred a seven-year-old child for 
life,” said the volunteer, who asked to remain anonymous.70 
                                                             
67 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2015, 21 
68 Ibid, 2 
69 A refugee from Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, the largest camp in the world, writes in 2010: ‘Our lives in the camps are far worse 
than you can imagine. We live in an open prison, far away from justice and humanity. We talk, but our voices are never heard. We 
move, but only inside a cage. We have many skills and talents, but we are denied our chance to maximize our potential. We are 
chained to a life full of stress and despair; a life for which many would prefer death. We are denied opportunities for education and 
employment. We live in a condition without adequate water, food, or health facilities. We are arbitrarily beaten or detained by police 
within the confines of the camp. We lack the ability to freely express ourselves or have control over the decisions affecting our lives.’ 
Contributor, ‘Kenya: A Voice from the voiceless: Dadaab refugee camps’, Pambazuka News, 16 April 2010 
70 Mark Townsend, ‘Sexual assaults on children’ at Greek refugee camps, the Observer, 13 August 2016 
20 
 
 
Those refugees that live outside of camps often live fringe existences, as quasi-criminals 
dodging detention, usually unable to enter the labour market and having to rely on handouts, 
often without basic necessities. Refugees, including many children are forced to enter informal 
labour markets, leading to exploitation and further risk. 
 
Travelling further afield 
 
The desperate conditions in neighbouring countries and the progressive loss of hope of 
returning home leads many refugees to look for options further afield. Many refugees seek to 
leave the camps, or bypass them altogether, looking somewhere for more permanent refuge. 
 
As lawful arrival by air has become increasingly difficult because of visa and carrier restrictions, 
many refugees use either land routes or travel by sea, or both. People pay smugglers significant 
amounts of money to travel on unseaworthy vessels is because they are legally prohibited, via 
these visa restrictions and carrier sanctions, from taking the safer and usually much cheaper 
options of regular sea vessels and flights.  
 
Due to restrictive immigration regimes in place, they must often have recourse to smugglers to 
reach their destination country, at least for some part of their journey. Refugees and other 
migrants pay smugglers exorbitant sums for the privilege of travelling using unseaworthy 
vessels or suffocating containers or sealed compartments hidden in trucks or vans. Smugglers, 
whose actions are illegal under both international and most national laws,71 have regularly 
abused asylum seekers and migrants or left them in dangerous situations, at times in collusion 
with officials.72 In some cases, refugees and other migrants may actually be trafficked, i.e. 
coerced and exploited.73  
 
There are a number of transit routes which vast numbers of refugees have used, each with their 
own dangers. The usage rates for these routes have changed over time, and have depended on 
the opening and closure of borders and other hardships along the way. Some of these routes are 
summarised below. 
 
i. Eritreans and others from the Horn of Africa through Egypt and the Sinai Desert 
towards Israel 
 
For "Adam”, a 31-year-old asylum seeker in Israel who fled Eritrea after being 
incarcerated and tortured for leaving military service without permission, life has been 
filled with uncertainty almost as long as he can remember. While crossing the Sinai 
Desert, Adam was taken for ransom by Bedouin smugglers; he suffered extensive 
beatings and torture before his family was able to pay the requested sum. After crossing 
the border to Israel he was placed in the Saharonim detention facility for three months. 74  
Many Eritreans and nationals from some other states in the Horn of Africa have taken a route 
through Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt through the Sinai desert with the hopes of reaching Israel 
and other countries. Others were seeking to reach other destinations in the region or were 
based in refugee camps but were abducted by traffickers and re-routed to the Sinai and towards 
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Israel.75 While crossing the Desert, many are held for ransom by smugglers and traffickers are 
subjects to makeshift detention and torture (sometimes resulting in death) until families are 
able to pay the requested sums. According to Human Rights Watch, these criminal gangs have 
perpetrated ‘rapes of both women and men; electric shocks; burning victims’ genitalia and other 
body parts with hot irons, boiling water, molten plastic, rubber, and cigarettes; beating them 
with metal rods or sticks; hanging victims from ceilings; threatening them with death; and 
depriving them of sleep for long periods.’ Seventeen of the victims said they saw others die of 
the torture.’76 Refugees attempting to cross the border between Egypt and Israel have 
reportedly been shot at, some of them killed.77 
 
ii. Sub-Saharan Africans to Libya towards Italy 
 
We walked west, into Sudan, to Khartoum, then into the Sahara and into Libya. There 
were a hundred and thirty-one of us. This is the story that we told later, to the police, the 
journalists, and the courts. One day in Libya, a band of armed Somalis came upon us. 
They forced us into vans and brought us to the town of Sabha, where they locked us up 
in a house. They made us stand for hours. They tied us upside down and beat the soles of 
our feet. They held weapons to our heads and fired bullets into the floor. They drove two 
of our young women into the desert, raped them, and returned with only one. They 
poured water over the floor and tried to shock us with a live wire, but they succeeded 
only in burning out the lights. 
 
The Somalis wanted a ransom of thirty-three hundred dollars a head. Two weeks later, 
most of our families had paid, so they drove us to Tripoli. They took us to the smuggler 
Ermias. He was dark-skinned, around thirty, well fed. He took sixteen hundred dollars 
from each of us to arrange a boat to Lampedusa. It’s an Italian island about a day off the 
Libyan coast. Many of us had never seen the sea and did not know how to swim. We 
asked if we could pay extra for life jackets; Ermias refused. His men locked us in a 
warehouse with many others, where we waited through the month of September, 2013. 
On October 2nd, hours before dawn, they drove us to the shore and ferried us out to a 
boat, sixty-five feet long. They packed more than five hundred of us onto the bridge and 
the deck and down in the cabins. The smugglers did not like the look of the boat, so 
heavy and low in the water, and so old. But they said, “God willing, you will be lucky.”78 
 
Those refugees that reach Libya with the ultimate objective of sailing to Italy face extreme 
hardship in the country. Libya is not party to the Refugee Convention, and has been repeatedly 
criticised for its failure to respect the rights of refugees, including the prohibition of 
refoulement.79 Libya also has a poor record of protecting human rights, particularly the 
prohibition of torture, both during and after the Ghaddafi regime. Since 2011, the conduct of 
militias and other forces have spiralled out of control, and the administration of justice is weak 
                                                             
75 Bahlbi Y. Malk, ‘Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling to and from Eastern Sudan: Intended and Unintended Consequences of 
States’ Policies’ (2016) 5(1) Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 215 
76 HRW, ‘Egypt/Sudan: Traffickers Who Torture - Egypt Should Use Sinai Security Operations to Suppress Trafficking’, 11 February 
2014. A trafficker reportedly explained to HRW: ‘The longest I held someone was seven months and the shortest was one month. 
The last group was four Eritreans and I tortured all of them. I got them to call their relatives and to ask them to pay $33,000 each. 
Sometimes I tortured them while they were on the phone so the relatives could hear them scream. I did to them what I do to 
everyone. I beat their legs and feet, and sometimes their stomachs and chest, with a wooden stick. I hang them upside down, 
sometimes for an hour. Three of them died because I beat them too hard. I released the one that paid. About two out of every 10 
people I torture pay what I ask. Some pay less and I release them. Others die of the torture. Sometimes when the wounds get bad 
and I want them to torture them more, I treat their wounds with bandages and alcohol…’ HRW, "I Wanted to Lie Down and Die" - 
Trafficking and Torture of Eritreans in Sudan and Egypt, 11 February 2014 
77 Patrick Strickland, ‘Sudanese refugees shot dead on Egypt-Israel border’, Al Jazeera, 15 November 2015 
78 Mattathias Schwartz, ‘Letter from Lampedusa: The Africans who risk all to reach Europe look to an exiled priest as their savior’, 
The New Yorker, 21 April 2014 
79 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, ECtHR, App. No. 27765/09 (Grand Chamber), 23 February 2012, paras. 153-56 
22 
 
to non-existent. The prevailing chaos has resulted in widespread violations, including racial 
discrimination and xenophobic attacks, committed with impunity.80  
 
Some refugees are abducted and controlled by criminal gangs of smugglers and subjected to 
various forms of torture in order to secure bribes and complicity. Others are detained and held 
by one or other of the Libyan militia groups operating in the country or by centres operating 
under the guise of the State’s Department to Combat Irregular Migration, many of which are 
controlled by armed groups. In detention, refugees face regular torture, inhuman conditions and 
the prospect of indefinite detention. A series of reports issued by Human Rights Watch based on 
interviews with (former) detainees document what happened to them in the centres of Gharyan, 
Kufra and Sabha, which Italy had funded and helped to build as part of earlier collaboration with 
Libya in 2003 and 2004.81 The Gharyan and Kufra centres are located in isolated areas. 
Conditions are extremely poor and several detainees are reported to have been subjected to 
torture, including being beaten with metal bars and plastic tubes when trying to escape, being 
administered electric shocks, subjected to sexual abuse and discriminatory ill-treatment of non-
Muslims.82  
 
Those that manage to avoid detention are in constant fear of arrest, unable to work but at the 
same time needing to find a way to survive and to secure the exorbitant costs for their perilous 
sea voyages. Libyan coastguard officials have intercepted boats destined for Italy, subjected the 
passengers to ill-treatment and returned the passengers to Libya where they were subjected to 
inhuman detention conditions.83 According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, refugees and other migrants are also subjected to violence in ‘connection houses’ 
where they can stay for a month, while awaiting departure to Europe. Many are tortured to 
extract more money, they are given meagre food rations to reduce weight for the journey, and 
women are taken away and raped.84  
 
In 2008, Italy and Libya signed the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation, which, 
inter alia, envisaged cooperation to intensify border controls; stop terrorism; crime; trafficking 
and smuggling of illegal migrants. The cooperation envisaged funding to Libya by both Italy and 
the EU.85 Notably, the treaty was framed in terms of security threats and criminal activities but 
inevitably affected asylum seekers fleeing persecution.86 It was premised on the desire to curb 
smuggling, but served the underlying purpose of deterring migration.87  
 
Following the fall of the Ghaddafi regime, Italy entered into new agreements with Libya in 
201188 and in April 2012.89 The latter agreement addresses training for Libyan security forces, 
reception, monitoring the borders, as well as voluntary return and repatriation, population 
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register and mechanisms for follow-up.  It is aimed at combating “illegal immigration” and 
makes scant reference to respect for refugee rights and human rights. Indeed, by using the term 
“illegal” immigration, and not “refugees” or “asylum-seekers”, the agreement suggests that all 
immigration is “illegal” and implies that none of the persons entering Libya has a valid claim to 
refugee status. In respect of activities against “illegal” immigration and stay of “illegal 
immigrants” in detention centres ‘the parties confirm their commitment to respect human 
rights protected by international conventions and agreements that are in force.’90 However, the 
agreement does not specify how that respect will be ensured and does not provide for any 
monitoring or accountability mechanism in case of breach.  
 
In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights determined that Italy violated the prohibition 
against torture amongst other violations when it intercepted migrant boats on the high seas and 
returned them to Libya.91 The case concerned the interception by Italy of three boats in the 
Maltese Search and Rescue area 35 nautical miles south of Lampedusa. Italian patrol boats sent 
230 migrants back to Libya, in accordance with Italy’s bilateral agreement with Libya. The Hirsi 
Jamaa ruling made clear that the principle of non-refoulement applied to the High Seas.  
 
The Hirsi Jamaa ruling makes clear that Italy’s co-operation with Libya can and has been 
incompatible with the prohibition of refoulement to torture. Equally, torture and other ill-
treatment in Libyan detention centres raise the question of whether Italy’s policy, particularly 
the financial support provided to build and maintain such centres, triggers its wider 
responsibility under international law. Italy has provided largely material support and 
supported capacity building. However, Italian authorities are not present in detention centres 
and do not direct or control Libyan authorities or militias in detention settings. Nonetheless, 
Italy may be responsible for complicity for aiding or assisting another state in the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act by the latter under general principles relating to state 
responsibility. Aiding and assisting has been understood to include providing funding.92 There is 
no evidence to suggest that Italy has cooperated with the intention to aid or assist Libya to 
breach the prohibition of torture. However, both at the time when the detention centres were 
built in 2003 and 2004 and following the fall of the Ghaddafi regime, allegations of widespread 
torture in Libya were public knowledge, also based on UN reports.93 Italy therefore provided 
financial assistance for the building and maintenance of detention centres, and continued its 
cooperation with Libya, arguably knowing that it would contribute to a practice of 
apprehending refugees and other migrants who were at a serious risk of ill-treatment or torture 
at the hands of Libyan authorities or militias. Beyond Italy’s formal responsibility, its funding 
and other support to Libya in relation to migrant detention also raises broader concerns over a 
policy that helps create and perpetuate an environment in which torture is rife, without 
ensuring that adequate safeguards are in place. 
 
Following several widely publicised boat capsizes off of Lampedusa, in 2014 the Italian navy 
began to operation a search and rescue operation – Mare Nostrum, which was responsible for 
saving many thousands of lives. It was later replaced by Triton, run by the EU border agency 
Frontex, which has a much more limited scope of operation (50km off the Italian coast) and thus 
has been less effective in preventing deaths.  
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iii. Mainly Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi refugees to Turkey then the Aegean Sea towards 
Greece and onwards to other countries in Europe 
 
Another route to Europe, mainly for Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans and some Iranians has been 
through Turkey to Greece and beyond. Few refugees have the intention to stay in Greece; from 
Greece, refugees have sought to travel onward through the western Balkans (until that route 
was closed) due north for Germany and other countries assumed to be more receptive to 
refugees. 
 
Turkey hosts over two million Syrian refugees and has been part of the principle route for 
refugees fleeing Syria. While in principle, Syrians crossing directly into Turkey to flee the 
conflict are allowed entry, there have been reports of restrictions and pushbacks. Turkey does 
not recognise the Syrian refugees as such but rather as temporary “guests” and subsequently 
entitled to a temporary protection regime which does not entitle the individuals to apply for 
refugee status. This is because while Turkey ratified the Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, it only recognises refugees originating from countries which are members of the 
Council of Europe.  
 
Smuggling networks have facilitated the voyage from Turkey to Greece, using unseaworthy and 
overcrowded vessels leading to capsizes and many deaths. 
 
On arrival in Greece, refugees face further hardships. There is insufficient infrastructure to deal 
with the humanitarian needs of large numbers of refugees, made much worse since the closure 
of borders of neighbouring countries, making onward movement impossible. Furthermore, 
there are insufficient personnel to process the vast numbers of asylum claims. Even before 
those border closures, the European Court of Human Rights had ruled that returns to Greece 
from other countries in Europe under the Dublin regulation94 would subject the individuals to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment on account of the poor conditions of his detention and 
living conditions.95 These findings were echoed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants’ concerns over detention in Greece: 
 
Irregular migrants are detained up to several months in various 
establishments, such as police stations, border guard stations and coast 
guard facilities, which are clearly not suitable for long-term detention. 
There are also some dedicated migration detention centres, some of 
which are converted military camps or police academies. As common 
standards are not applied, the detention conditions and the safeguards 
available vary significantly in the different establishments and 
locations. The Special Rapporteur visited 11 detention facilities in 
Greece. In general, detention conditions at all [sic] were inappropriate. 
Migrants were locked in their cells for most of the day with no activities 
to keep them occupied. Several of the detention centres did not have 
fenced-in outdoor areas, thus police officers were reluctant to letting 
the migrants go outside at all, as they risk disciplinary action if a 
migrant escapes. The conditions at Venna detention centre were 
particularly poor, and the Special Rapporteur was pleased to hear that 
this centre closed down shortly after his visit. 
 
In some of the detention facilities, the migrants had limited access to 
toilets; some facilities had no artificial lighting so that during the 
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winter, migrants were in the dark from early afternoon. Most of the 
detention facilities visited lacked heating and hot water and the 
detainees complained about insufficient amounts and poor quality of 
food, lack of soap and other hygiene products, as well as insufficient 
clothing, shoes and blankets.96  
 
The European Union’s response to the growing crisis was to strike a deal with Turkey aimed at 
returning all persons irregularly entering the Greek islands after 20 March 2016 to Turkey. As 
part of the deal, Turkey was deemed a “safe third country”, which has been highly disputed.97 
But UNHCR’s Executive Committee has concluded that an asylum-seeker whose claim has yet to 
be determined from the territory of the country where the claim has been submitted should 
only be returned to a third country if it should be established that the third country will treat 
the asylum-seeker(s) in accordance with accepted international standards, such as ensuring 
effective protection against refoulement, and will provide the asylum-seeker(s) with the 
possibility to seek and enjoy asylum. This conclusion applies to all scenarios including pursuant 
to bilateral or multilateral readmission agreements.98 As part of this deal, one refugee in Europe 
is sent to Turkey, and in exchange, one refugee is taken from a camp in Turkey and resettled to 
Europe. It is unclear how this scheme will work following the recent coup attempt in Turkey 
and the worsening security and human rights situation in the country. 
 
iv. Burmese Rohingya in the Andaman Sea towards Thailand and Malaysia towards other 
destinations in Asia 
 
There has been a mass exodus of the Burmese Rohingya minority on account of the persecution 
they face in the country. Many have embarked on perilous journeys by boat, with the aid of 
traffickers and other corrupt middlemen. Women are often raped on the boats or are forced into 
marriage with men who pay for their journey. According to one passenger, who watched her 
brother die when fighting broke out after the captain of their wooden boat fled on a speedboat, 
leaving more than 800 passengers adrift with dwindling food and water: ‘If I had known the 
boat journey would be so horrendous, I would rather have just died in Myanmar [Burma].’99 
Some of the boats were simply left to drift at sea with Governments in the region often refusing 
the boats permission to land. Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to take a number of the refugees 
ashore, though many refugees remain detained.100 
 
Some of the refugees have been held by traffickers in torture camps along the Thai – Malay 
border until a ransom is paid for their freedom. Mass graves have reportedly been located in 
Malaysia,101 which has led to a landmark criminal trial of 92 traffickers in Thailand.102 Despite 
this, Thailand has reportedly refouled numerous Rohingya back to Burma without proper 
scrutiny of their claims.103 
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Government policy responses encourage risky journeys 
 
What each of the above examples show is that Governments’ policy responses to the perilous 
journeys taken by refugees is to focus their attention on denying entry and taking steps to 
dismantle criminal trafficking and smuggling gangs. These efforts are prone to failure as they 
ignore the very nature of refugees: people are fleeing their homes because they must; this is not 
a choice that they make or a weighing up of options. Refugees flee because they have run out of 
options. Traffickers and smugglers are a product of the demand. When governments foreclose 
all legal and safe options of flight, refugees will use traffickers and smugglers – because they 
must. Their activities should be prosecuted and severely punished however there will be new 
gangs to take their place, to be sure.  
 
The European Union in particular has focused on partnerships with neighbouring transit 
countries to stem the flow of refugees to Europe.104 Whether intended or not, the clear and 
foreseeable outcome of such policies is a denial of protection to vulnerable refugees, a 
heightened risk of torture and ill-treatment and a renunciation of the fundamental non-
refoulement obligations. But as Crépeau indicates, ‘It appears much more "efficient" to do 
capacity building in transit states so that their authorities will carry out the arrest, detention, 
and deportation of irregular migrants, and refugee determination procedures if need be. Most of 
those countries do not have the same democratic culture, the same human rights protection 
infrastructure, the same active and vocal civil society organisations caring for migrants, the 
same investigative journalism, or the same independent and competent judiciary.’105 Crépeau 
explains:  
 
The efficiency argument is twofold. First, most transit States only reluctantly accept to 
actually create a "refugee and migration problem" for themselves when migrants usually 
enter and exit the country without much fuss. Turkey has signed an immigration 
readmission agreement with the EU as a stepping stone to its accession to the EU, but 
doesn't effectively clamp down on irregular migration unless actively prodded by some 
EU States. Second, forcing transit States to combat irregular migration means that such 
migration will be driven underground-or further underground-and that smuggling rings 
and mafias will control the trade, creating additional law-and-order issues for the 
authorities, and, in the end, reducing the efficiency of migration controls.  
 
The legal argument is that Global North States are responsible for their actions. If they 
knowingly empower other States to commit human rights violations against migrants, 
they should be held accountable for their co-responsibility in such violations.106 
 
IV.3 Building Fortresses 
 
In order to quell the tide of refugees, states have pursued a series of measures - as part of 
increasingly restrictive migration policies - to prevent refugees and other migrants from 
entering their territory. These have included imposing restrictive visa regimes and air carrier 
sanctions, erecting physical barriers at borders, the summary rejection of asylum-seekers at 
borders or points of entry, creating international zones, creating buffer zones or designating 
safe areas as well as the maritime interception of asylum seekers and other migrants.107 As 
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Gammeltoff-Hansen and Hathaway have noted, what they term the policies of non-entree have 
fuelled the gaps between rich and poor countries, and in many ways have undermined the 
implementation of collective burden-sharing:  
 
Non-entrée allows wealthier states to insist upon the importance of refugee protection 
as a matter of international legal obligation, knowing that they will largely be spared its 
burdens. It enables a pattern of minimalist engagement under which the formal 
commitment to refugee law can be proclaimed as a matter of principle without risk that 
the wealthier world will actually be compelled to live up to that regime's burdens and 
responsibilities to any serious extent. Non-entrée mechanisms have overall proved 
highly effective: the developed world today protects less than 20% of the world's 
refugees and is subject to no binding duty even to share the costs of protection in the 
less developed world, much less to resettle refugees to their own territories.108 
 
But at least some of these deterrent practises may not relieve a state from its responsibilities 
and may nonetheless result in refoulement. Firstly, states’ obligations towards individuals 
deserving protection do not start only once a state recognises or confirms an individual’s status 
as a refugee. Refugee status is declaratory, and thus the obligations which accrue to refugees, 
including non-refoulement, applies to any person who meets the refugee definition, irrespective 
of whether the person concerned has been formally recognised as a refugee, and thus, it 
includes asylum-seekers whose status has not yet been formally decided. A person does not 
become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognised because s/he is a refugee. Thus, the 
principle of non-refoulement applies presumptively to persons claiming refugee status but 
whose claims have not been determined.109 Secondly, and following directly from the first 
principle, the principle of non-refoulement is understood to encompass the circumstances when 
a refugee is rejected at the frontier. UNHCR has made clear that ‘[i]n all cases the fundamental 
principle of non-refoulement – including non-rejection at the frontier – must be scrupulously 
observed.’110  Thus, borders should not be closed or impenetrable to prevent the entry of 
refugees, as this may violate the state’s non-refoulement obligations.  
 
The OAU Convention111 and Cartagena Declaration112 both explicitly link non-refoulement to 
non-rejection at the frontier. Under human rights law, a state’s obligations are engaged as soon 
as the State can be said to be exercising effective control. In the Hirsi Jamaa case, the European 
Court of Human Rights recognised that Italy’s obligations under the Convention were activated, 
even in the High Seas.113 This ruling was reinforced by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
who explained that ‘[t]he obligations enshrined in the [Torture] Convention also apply to state 
vessels patrolling or conducting border control operations on the high seas and states’ 
pushbacks of migrants under their jurisdiction can breach the prohibition of torture and ill-
treatment and non-refoulement obligations’.114  The prohibition of refoulement is 
complemented by the prohibition of arbitrary expulsion115 and of collective expulsion, which 
equally applies from the moment a state has jurisdiction over a person or a group of persons.116 
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The US Supreme Court’s majority decision in the 1993 Sale vs. Haitian Councils Centre ruling 
confirmed the legality of the US practice of intercepting and forcibly returning Haitians at sea.117 
However this decision was severely criticised by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights in Haitian Centre for Human Rights v United States, and the approach taken by the 
Supreme Court was not followed by the European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy 
or by the UN Committee Against Torture in Marine I, both of which held that states are bound by 
the prohibition of refoulement from the moment, and as long as, a person comes within the 
jurisdiction of a state, even if this person is outside the state’s physical territory.118 
IV.3.1 Closing borders and building physical barriers 
 
The closing of borders to prevent mass influxes of refugees is a practise with a long history. It 
was used by many states in Europe and further afield to prevent Jews and others fleeing Nazi 
persecution119 and those fleeing fascism in Spain, a situation deemed so unacceptable in 
hindsight to many states that it was one of the main impetuses for the Refugee Convention.  
 
Some states close borders as an immediate or ad hoc response to what is perceived as a crisis 
level flow of refugees, because there is insufficient staff to process the entrants and inadequate 
associated humanitarian resources in place. These may be temporary measures to get the 
necessary staff in place, or more long-term measures designed to prevent the flows altogether 
because of the perceived security or resource-driven fears associated with admitting large 
numbers of foreigners to the country.  Sometimes border closures are an attempt by the state to 
secure greater support from the international community.120 
 
In response to recent mass influxes, several states have fortified their borders and use force 
such as tear gas and rubber bullets when patrolling them to prevent unauthorised entry. Some 
states, such as Austria, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Macedonia, Spain, Turkey and 
the USA, have built fences or walls to better control entry and ultimately keep out “irregular 
migrants” including refugees.121 
 
Effectively sealing off borders makes it impossible for states to distinguish between ‘irregular’ 
migrants and refugees. States have a right under international law to control the entry of non-
nationals into their territory. However, states that turn asylum seekers away at their border or 
erect walls and fences to avoid giving asylum seekers the opportunity to have their status 
determined, can breach the prohibition of refoulement. This is further aggravated when states 
use force to turn back or repel asylum seekers, as has reportedly happened in countries such as 
Egypt, Spain and the USA. 
 
Border closures and barriers expose asylum seekers and other migrants to an increased risk ‘en 
route’ or of injuring themselves or dying when seeking to cross the barriers, as well as to being 
subjected to the use of force by border patrols. Where they reach borders and have to turn back, 
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refugees and other migrants risk abuse by criminal gangs operating in border areas who prey 
on the vulnerability of anyone stranded in what is an alien environment.122  
IV.3.2 ‘Pushbacks’, interdiction on the High Seas and off-shore processing arrangements 
 
States regularly push back refugees across the border from where they came or indeed prevent 
them from arriving. Sometimes there is no apparent justification and it is simply a form of 
collective expulsion or dereliction of responsibility, as was the fate of some Burmese Rohingya, 
left stranded at sea. Other times, such policies are pursued under the guise that a receiving 
country is a safe third country;123 financial assistance is provided to the receiving  countries 
which may be the country of last transit or another country who has simply agreed to the deal, 
in exchange for taking the human burden of the refugees. This is a further means by which 
wealthy countries have simply sought to buy themselves out of their obligations to receive and 
process refugee claims.  It undermines the goals of the Refugee Convention and makes a 
mockery of global burden sharing.   
Bilateral and multilateral agreements are central to the implementation of these various forms 
of extraterritorial deterrence and at the same time have given a gloss of legality to policies 
which often result in a breach of individuals’ fundamental rights. Within the European Union, 
the Dublin regulation operates so as to prevent refugees from movement within the Union. It 
requires that the EU Member State where the migrant first enters must assess the individuals’ 
status and where appropriate, to afford protection. Under the regulation, migrants who travel 
onward to other Member States may be returned to the country of entry, which under the 
regulation is deemed a safe third country. This regulation has placed a difficult burden on Italy, 
Greece and Spain who are faced with the bulk of arrivals. The regulation has been upheld by 
courts but the European Court of Human Rights has determined that due to the specificities of 
some particular cases, it would violate the applicant’s rights to return them to the state through 
which they first arrived.124  
Other bilateral and multilateral agreements entered into, with states known for their limited 
protection of refugee rights and record of non-adherence to the prohibition of torture, are set 
out below. Many of these agreements contain undertakings that the latter states will respect the 
rights of persons transferred to them and will not send them to countries where they face a real 
risk of persecution (refoulement). However, the states predominantly do not have satisfactory 
systems of refugee status determination in place, some are not party to the relevant Refugee 
Conventions and sub-standard conditions of detention and the poor treatment of detained 
asylum seekers and other migrants, including the lack of protection against attacks by fellow 
detainees and members of the local populations have been well-documented.  
 
The EU has embarked on a diplomatic offensive to establish partnerships with a range of 
countries under the European Agenda on Migration, listing as priority countries: Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia. Additional countries identified as short-term 
priorities are Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and Morocco.125 The majority of these are 
major refugee producing countries where torture is routinely practiced.  
 
The EU should be minded to have careful regard to the failings and devastating consequences of 
the Australian Government’s notorious approach of pushbacks and outsourcing, which have 
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resulted in deaths, torture and mistreatment, profound psychological harm as a result of the 
hopeless situation in which detainees find themselves in, and a derogation of all responsibility 
for which it has been uniformly condemned. As part of its interdiction at sea policy, Australia 
has about 20 bilateral arrangements with source countries like Indonesia and Malaysia to 
suppress smuggling or accept returnees, often in exchange for informal aid projects.  Its policy 
of off-shore detention has come to the fore with the release of over 2,000 leaked reports to the 
Guardian newspaper.126 But reports of devastating abuses have been well-known for years, with 
little appreciable impact on the reform of policies. A report by the Australian Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee into certain incidents at the Manus Island 
Detention Centre in February 2014 found that a policy of prolonged and potentially indefinite 
periods of detention and of encouraging asylum seekers to return home, instead of continuing 
to live in a state of limbo, may also amount to constructive (de facto) refoulement by making 
living conditions so intolerable that the asylum seekers agree to leave “voluntarily”.127 The 
Committee found that the events which included rioting and deaths were foreseeable, and may 
have been prevented if transferees had been given a clear pathway for the assessment of their 
asylum claims.128 It also determined that the Australian Government was responsible for  failing 
to protect asylum seekers from excessive use of force.129 It determined that ‘the degree of 
involvement by the Australian Government in the establishment, use, operation, and provision 
of total funding for the centre clearly satisfies the test of effective control in international law, 
and the government's ongoing refusal to concede this point displays a denial of Australia's 
international obligations.’130  
 
A number of allegations of sexual assaults, including rape, by fellow detainees and by members 
of staff, as well as other incidents, prompted an official review in October 2014 ‘into recent 
allegations relating to conditions and circumstances’ at the Nauru RPC (also referred to as the 
Moss report).131 The review ‘became aware of allegations of indecent assault, sexual harassment 
and physical assault occurring in the Centre’, and, after noting that some of them ‘had not been 
formally reported’, concluded ‘that there is a level of under-reporting of transferees of sexual 
and other physical assault.’132 It further concluded that ‘many transferees are apprehensive 
about their personal safety and have concerns about their privacy in the Centre… The 
perception of a lack of personal safety and privacy is heightened by high density 
accommodation in mostly un-aired-conditioned, soft-walled marquees in a tropical climate.’133 
The review found a number of structural shortcomings, including inadequate arrangements for 
complaints mechanisms, lack of adequate training, and the need for a clearer relationship 
between privatised service providers and the Nauruan Police Force.134 The Australian National 
Human Rights Commission also raised a number of concerns, particularly about the treatment 
of children and the inadequacy of pre-transfer assessments.135 
 
Bilateral and multilateral agreements entered into, with states known for their limited 
protection of refugee rights and record of non-adherence to the prohibition of torture:136 
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(i) Providing funding to transit or other third countries for migration control 
and/or off-shore processing purposes, such as the United States to Mexico, Spain 
to Morocco and Italy to Libya. This is the essence of the European Agenda on 
Migration, as explained above.137 The EU has funded states such as Turkey and 
Ukraine to strengthen border controls and build immigration detention facilities.138 
The ostensible purpose of this policy is to prevent asylum seekers and other 
migrants from reaching the territories of EU Member States by land through key 
transit countries. The policy and underlying agreements have been criticised, also on 
account of a series of reports on poor detention conditions and ill-treatment of 
refugees in both Turkey and the Ukraine.139  Australia has provided funding to Sri 
Lanka to advance its non-entry policy.140 Australia has also rendered the application 
of mainland protection procedures inapplicable to asylum seekers who arrive by 
boat in particularly designated “excised offshore places”, and transferred asylum 
seekers to Pacific Islands such as Christmas Island, Papua New Guinea, Manus or 
Nauru for so-called offshore processing, detention, settlement or sent to a safe third 
country, such as Cambodia,141 and it has funded and overseen these operations.142  
 
(ii) Providing equipment, machinery, and training or extraneous funding such as 
aid or debt relief to the cooperating state, for example Italy to Libya, USA to 
Mexico, Spain to Morocco and Australia to Sri Lanka. Australia funded and closely 
cooperated with the International Organisation for Migration to build and maintain 
immigrant detention facilities in Indonesia.143 Australia pursued this policy 
notwithstanding public knowledge about poor conditions of detention and ill-
treatment in Indonesia’s immigration detention centres.144  Australia provided 
patrol boats to Sri Lanka in 2013, which has reportedly preventing individuals from 
leaving their own country145 and enhanced the risk of torture of anyone attempting 
to flee that is intercepted by Sri Lankan officials, documented in several instances.146  
 
(iii) Deploying or seconding officials from the destination state to cooperate with 
officials in other states (origin, transit), such as US officials to states in Central 
America and Mexico, and other regions of the world. 
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(iv) “Joint or shared enforcement”, such as by the US Government with Mexican 
authorities, Australia with Sri Lanka, and Spain with Senegal and Mauritania. 
 
(v) Measures taken by authorities on the territory of the state of origin or transit, 
such as European states operating in the waters of Libya, Mauritania and Senegal. 
 
(vi) Use of international agencies to carry out joint deterrent action in the name of 
multiple states, such as the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(Frontex).147 Frontex has provided support to European Member States, such as 
Greece, including by assisting in the detention of migrants, notwithstanding the 
woefully inadequate conditions of detention and heightened risks of ill-treatment.148   
 
As already indicated, states’ responsibilities apply extraterritorially to the extent that the 
persons are under the effective control of that state.149 This has been made clear in the Hirsi case 
in relation to states’ responsibilities on the High Seas; it has also been made clear by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, who has indicated that ‘[r]efoulement may implicate 
extraterritorial State conduct whenever States operate and hold individuals abroad, as in the 
context of armed conflict or offshore detention or refugee processing facilities.’150 Furthermore, 
what is also clear is that states cannot avoid their international obligations by using or hiring 
other states or private actors to exercise their governmental activity.151 This is without 
prejudice to the receiving states’ own responsibility for the violations of the human rights of 
refugees and the potential contractual, criminal and tort liability of private service providers 
who often implement on behalf of the various governments.  
 
Given the nature of push-backs and other deterrence strategies, once the refugees have been 
returned or sent to a third country, it will be difficult if not impossible for them to pursue 
effective complaints and remedies against an offending state or other responsible actor, 
regardless of their responsibility under domestic or international law. The would-be 
complainants will typically not have access to lawyers in the offending state and their situation 
of vulnerability and utter destination makes such legal remedies illusory in all but a small few 
cases. In the absence of safeguards, monitoring and effective complaints procedures concerning 
these deterrence strategies, it is difficult to establish the extent of the practice of ill-treatment in 
such contexts, which perpetuates the prevailing lack of transparency and impunity. 
 
IV.4 The destination country 
 
‘I slept that night in Brixton, at the tube station. An old man who was drinking told me 
the Home office was in Croydon and that I needed to get another bus. I gave him some 
money to buy a ticket, but he took the money and didn’t give me the ticket. A bus driver 
told me he would tell me where the Home Office was. When I got there it was Friday and 
it was closed. I stayed there Friday, Saturday, Sunday. I didn’t eat because my money 
was finished. I just went and sat in one corner and cried, thinking maybe I should throw 
myself in front of a car, it’s the end of my life. I asked some people when the Home Office 
was open, they said things like ‘Shut up’ and ‘Fuck off.’ On Monday I went back there 
very early in the morning. I saw a lot of people standing there. I saw some black people 
so I thought ‘Maybe I should ask these ones’. That’s how I went to Home Office.’152 
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By the time they reach their final destination, refugees are likely to be physically and 
emotionally exhausted, confused and disoriented. They will have built up all sorts of 
expectations about the destination, which have kept them motivated, and moving, towards their 
ultimate goal. Rarely will what they find on arrival meet those expectations.   
 
 
IV.4.1 Refugee claims determination 
 
… the shortcomings in access to the asylum procedure and in the examination of 
applications for asylum …: insufficient information for asylum-seekers about the 
procedures to be followed; difficult access to the Attica police headquarters; no reliable 
system of communication between the authorities and the asylum-seekers; a shortage of 
interpreters and lack of training of the staff responsible for conducting the individual 
interviews; a lack of legal aid effectively depriving the asylum-seekers of legal counsel; 
and excessively lengthy delays in receiving a decision. These shortcomings affect 
asylum-seekers arriving in Greece for the first time as well as those sent back there in 
application of the Dublin Regulation. The Court is also concerned…  that almost all first-
instance decisions are negative and drafted in a stereotyped manner without any details 
of the reasons for the decisions being given …  
 
The Court concludes that to date the Greek authorities have not taken any steps to 
communicate with the applicant or reached any decision in his case, offering him no real 
and adequate opportunity to defend his application for asylum. What is more, the Court 
takes note of the extremely low rate of asylum or subsidiary protection granted by the 
Greek authorities compared with other European Union member States …. The 
importance to be attached to statistics varies, of course, according to the circumstances, 
but in the Court’s view they tend here to strengthen the applicant’s argument 
concerning his loss of faith in the asylum procedure.  
 
… the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in 
conjunction with Article 3 because of the deficiencies in the Greek authorities’ 
examination of the applicant’s asylum request and the risk he faces of being returned 
directly or indirectly to his country of origin without any serious examination of the 
merits of his asylum application and without having access to an effective remedy.153 
 
The Refugee Convention makes clear that persons who have a legitimate fear of persecution on 
the basis of one of the enumerated grounds in the Convention should be recognised as refugees, 
barring the exclusion provisions already present in the Convention. There will normally be a 
claims procedure in the destination country which assesses the applicant’s claims for refugee 
status.  
 
However, few countries have put in place fair and efficient refugee claims determination 
procedures that are child and gender-sensitive, and capable of adequately determining claims 
and preventing refoulement. In many regions, mass influxes in which there is an arrival of large 
numbers of applicants who may have no valid claim to protection at the same time as the arrival 
of masses of persons with valid refugee claims can complicate and in some instances jeopardize 
the effectiveness of national procedures for the determination of refugee status.  
 
But most importantly, policies of deterrence tend to infect claims determination procedures.   
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Australian authorities conducted refugee status determinations of the passengers from 
the ACV Triton by satellite phone as part of the Australian Government’s ‘enhanced 
screening’ process. This process involves asking each of the asylum seekers a set of four 
questions and determining their refugee status on the basis of their answers to these 
questions (the asylum seeker’s name, country of origin, where they had come from, and 
why they had left) without a right to appeal a negative decision. Some passengers 
reported that they could not understand the immigration officials with whom they were 
speaking, or hear them properly over the sound of machinery on the open deck of the 
ship. One asylum seeker estimated that the satellite phone dropped out between ten and 
fifteen times during the interview which lasted 30 to 45 minutes. Several passengers 
also stated that they did not feel they could speak freely to immigration officials because 
their interviews were conducted in front of other passengers. Forty passengers had 
their asylum claims rejected. One Sinhalese passenger was assessed as being eligible for 
further assessment. He elected to return to Sri Lanka with the other passengers when 
informed that he would be transferred to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea or Nauru and 
be placed in immigration detention pending his refugee status determination. (footnotes 
omitted)154 
 
Restrictive claims processing procedures are often aimed at expediting status determination 
and removal. ‘Fast track’ procedures can reduce procedural fairness for applicants and increase 
prospects for detention despite vulnerability, which in turn increases the likelihood of torture 
and ill-treatment, and will make worse the trauma and suffering of those who have escaped 
intense violence. Truncated procedures also limit the possibility for the asylum seeker to put 
forward their own narrative of why they have a genuine fear of persecution and to present the 
relevant evidence to substantiate their claims. As explained by Vogl, ‘Those who cannot tell their 
stories quickly or provide evidence fast enough will fail in their applications for protection.’155 
 
Asylum seekers should have a personal interview and be provided with legal assistance, and 
procedures should be in place to identify and assist vulnerable asylum seekers. Yet, unclear 
legislative frameworks, arbitrary decision-making, as well as limited access to the necessary 
information and legal assistance to pursue their claims are at the heart of procedures that 
frequently result in the rejection of applications. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
stressed the importance of guarding against arbitrariness. In the case of the Pacheco Tineo 
Family v. Bolivia, which concerned Bolivia’s treatment of a family of asylum seekers from Peru, 
the Court underscored that ‘in application of the principles of non-discrimination and due 
process [states] must ensure predictable proceedings, as well as coherence and objectivity in 
decision-making at each stage of the proceedings to avoid arbitrary decisions.’156  
 
UNHCR has stressed that  
 
‘[i]n most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest 
necessities and very frequently even without personal documents. Thus, while the 
burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all 
the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some 
cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the 
necessary evidence in support of the application. Even such independent research may 
not, however, always be successful and there may also be statements that are not 
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susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant’s account appears credible, he should, 
unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.157 
 
The UN Committee Against Torture has underscored that states cannot sit back and wait for 
vulnerable claimants to put forward incontrovertible proof which they will never be able to 
access; once a claimant makes a prima facie case, the state is obligated to make sufficient efforts 
to determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.158  
 
Despite this, many states place administrative and logistical hurdles in front of claimants and 
often states place undue evidential burdens or misapply the terms of the Refugee Convention. 
Some states use inferences when assessing the credibility of claims, such as the failure to submit 
an asylum request within a certain time limit or the inability to recall certain details. Such 
approaches ignore the impact that trauma has been found to have on refugees’ ability to recall 
with clarity their experiences,159 and may result in a majority of claims being denied. The UN 
Committee Against Torture has held that complete accuracy could not be expected by victims of 
torture, especially those suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome, as long as any 
inconsistencies were of an immaterial nature and did not raise doubts about the general 
veracity of the author’s claims.160 The UNHCR guidelines indicate that the applicant must be able 
to demonstrate ‘good reasons’ for the fear of persecution which must be well-founded.161 But 
what is clear is that the criteria and standards of proof for determining whether an applicant 
has a well-founded fear of persecution is applied differently from one state to another, often 
leading to vastly differing results.162 In some countries such as Israel163 and Japan, the 
acceptance rate for claims is less than 1%.  
 
When an individual faces a risk of torture or other prohibited ill-treatment, states are obligated 
to take into account the standards that apply to the non-refoulement to torture provisions set 
out in many human rights treaties. In Aemei v. Switzerland, the UN Committee Against Torture 
made clear that the author’s expulsion to Iran would have the ‘foreseeable consequence of 
exposing him to a real and personal risk of being arrested and tortured.’164  
 
In some countries, the ‘bad faith’ of an asylum seeker has been used as a basis to deny refugee 
status, even though the requirement of ‘good faith’ is not present in the Convention which 
focuses simply on determining whether there is a credible risk of persecution.165 Bad faith has 
been said to exist for instance, when an asylum applicant manufactures a risk of harm in the 
home country which did not previously exist. This approach has been rejected by some UK 
courts.166 
Rejected asylum seekers should be able to challenge any adverse decisions made and should be 
permitted to remain in the country while the appeal is being determined. Unsuccessful 
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applicants should be enabled to have a negative decision reviewed before rejection at the 
frontier or forcible removal from the territory.  However often, there is a lack of effective 
remedies to challenge the denial of refugee status. And, persons are being removed before their 
non-refoulement claims have been resolutely determined, whether at the domestic level, 
pending appeals or when there are pending procedures before regional or international claims 
processes.  
 
IV.4.2 Immigration detention 
 
Immigration detention deprives persons of their liberty even though they have not committed 
any crime. It also frequently exposes asylum seekers and other migrants to an enhanced risk of 
torture or other ill-treatment. It can also contribute to the deterioration of detainees’ mental 
health,167 as well as add a further layer of bewilderment, frustration and helplessness.168  Many 
asylum seekers are survivors of torture. As torture often takes place in a detention setting, 
detaining torture victims can trigger traumatic reactions.169 
 
Such detention is incompatible with human rights law unless stringent conditions are met. The 
detention cannot be arbitrary;170 it cannot be based solely on the fact that someone has entered 
a country to seek asylum;171  it must not be indeterminate172 and it must be subject to judicial 
control and other safeguards.173 The decision to detain must consider the individual 
circumstances of the person(s) concerned. As a rule, particularly vulnerable persons including 
unaccompanied minors174 and others should not be detained.175 The EU Recast Reception 
Conditions Directive and the EU Return Directive list survivors of ‘torture, rape or other serious 
forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence’ under the category of vulnerable persons 
requiring special attention.176 The Directives do not prohibit detention of vulnerable persons 
but instead stipulate a duty to monitor and provide adequate support and health services.177 
This approach is insufficient in that it does not address the link between the detention itself and 
re-traumatisation. Also it ignores the numerous examples of states’ failure to provide adequate 
support and health services.178 Detention should ‘only be resorted to when it is determined to 
be necessary, reasonable in all the circumstances and proportionate to a legitimate purpose.’179  
Protection of public order, public health and national security are recognised as legitimate 
purposes. In contrast, punitive considerations, deterrence or administrative convenience are 
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not.180 Asylum seekers should not be detained together with suspected or convicted 
criminals.181  
Who is detained? 
Frequent resort to immigration detention is a product of the tendency to criminalise the asylum 
seeking process, explained in earlier sections. The Global Detention Project has reported that 
nearly 60 detention centres have been used in Egypt to house migrants, including victims of 
trafficking, refugees and others.182 In some countries, prolonged and sometimes indefinite 
immigration detention has also been used as a tactic to remove unwanted migrants from sight, 
to inhibit access to information, to counsel, to translators, to expedite processing of dubious 
claims and removals, and to deter future migrants. In Australia, any person who arrives by sea 
without a visa is automatically detained as an ‘unlawful’ migrant.183 
 
UNHCR makes clear in its guidelines that vulnerable people should not be detained. In practise 
however, they often are. Indonesia, for example, has been condemned for detaining child 
migrants,184 as has Australia185 and Greece.186 In the European context, only a minority of states 
have put procedures in place to screen refugees to identify torture survivors and make 
arrangements for alternatives to detention,187 and the procedures where they are in place lack 
clarity and are not applied uniformly. In the UK, torture survivors should be identified during 
the screening interview prior to any detention or at the beginning of a period, or during 
detention.  Rule 35 of the Detention Centre Rules of 2001 is meant to act as a safeguard for 
vulnerable individuals whose detention would be inappropriate. It requires medical 
practitioners in detention centres to report to the centre manager any cases in which there are: 
(1) concerns that continued detention may be injurious to the detainee’s health; (2) concerns 
that the detainee may be a suicide risk; or (3) may have been a victim of torture.188 However, the 
High Court found that Rule 35 reports ‘are not the effective safeguard they are supposed to be’ 
and do not in fact work to remove unsuitable cases from detention.189 A Home Office audit found 
that only nine percent of Rule 35 reports led to release.190 In one particularly egregious case, 
Alois Dvorzac, an 84 year old man suffering from Alzheimer’s who died in handcuffs while 
detained, had reportedly been the subject of a Rule 35 report stating that he was unfit for 
detention.191 Similar problems have been encountered in other countries with large numbers of 
asylum seekers. In the USA, screening is not uniformly in place,192 and the practice lacks 
transparency and consistency.193 Similar criticisms have been levelled against Australia.194 
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Sometimes a receiving country will put in place special detention rules for persons coming from 
a particular country or understood to pose a particularly security threat. Israel, for example, 
was effectively keeping Sudanese asylum seekers who were perceived as a security threat, in 
indefinite detention.195 Israel’s Supreme Court found that the law which sought to provide a 
legal basis for the detention of asylum seekers coming from countries “hostile” to Israel violated 
the right to liberty.196 In response, Israel enacted Amendment No.4, which provided for the 
indefinite detention of Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers in the “Holot”, i.e. a desert camp. 
Amendment No.4 was again successfully challenged, with the Supreme Court annulling its 
detention provisions in September 2014.197 Asylum-seekers detained in Holot are now offered 
to leave Israel for an unnamed third country [understood to be Rwanda or Uganda]. If they 
refuse to do so, after 30 days, they would be incarcerated in Saharonim prison.198 It also 
discriminates against asylum seekers on the basis of their origin, declaring that they come from 
a hostile country when it is this very country whose hostility forced them to leave. 
For how long?  
The UN Human Rights Committee found that a four year period of detention of an asylum seeker 
on the ground that he had entered Australia illegally and may abscond if left at liberty was 
disproportionate and arbitrary.199 The detention of an Iranian asylum seeker who had 
developed mental health problems for over two years ‘without individual justification and 
without any chance of substantive judicial review’ was also considered by the Committee to be 
arbitrary.200 It also found arbitrary the practice of mandatory detention upon arrival coupled 
with adverse security assessments, where ‘the authors … are not informed of the specific risk 
attributed to each of them and of the efforts undertaken by the Australian authorities to find 
solutions which would allow them to obtain their liberty. They are also deprived of legal 
safeguards allowing them to challenge their indefinite detention.’201 
 
Arbitrary, potentially indefinite, detention has also been held to violate the prohibition of 
torture and ill-treatment. In F.K.A.G. et al. v Australia, counsel had informed the Human Rights 
Committee about the ‘escalating risk to the mental and physical health of the authors in 
detention’, including attempted self-harm and suicide.202  Indefinite detention of asylum seekers 
without any clear procedure and prospect for release is inherently incompatible with the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment where the detention contributed to the deterioration of 
the applicant’s mental health.203 This jurisprudence is echoed by Australia’s Human Rights 
Commission in a case concerning the detention of an asylum seeker for 33 months.204 
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Torture and ill-treatment in Detention 
Torture and ill-treatment of migrants is a pernicious problem in many transit countries where 
individuals are detained, but also in destination countries. 205 It is committed by those officials 
who guard the facilities; sometimes these are state officials but increasingly they are individuals 
paid by private security companies contracted by the state. In South Africa, for example, 
unqualified staff employed by the company G4S reportedly forcibly injected dozens of detainees 
with anti-psychotic medication and used electric shocks to subdue them, in addition to holding 
detainees in isolation cells for up to three years.206  
 
Excessive force has been used as a disciplining and restraining tool and a means to quell 
protests.207 Allegations of sexual violence are widespread. Male personnel employed by Serco in 
Yarl’s Wood, United Kingdom, for example, are alleged to have looked at women taking showers, 
using routine checks as pretext, offered favours in exchange for sexual services, and adopted a 
culture of bullying and intimidation. The Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable 
Persons by Stephen Shaw, found in its January 2016 report that there should be a presumption 
against detention for persons with a diagnosis of PTSD, victims of rape and other sexual or 
gender-‐based violence and transsexual people, among others, and an absolute exclusion for 
pregnant women.208  
 
National legal frameworks frequently prove inadequate to provide protection against sexual 
abuse, particularly by not setting out adequate offences for abuse of power and various forms of 
gender-based violence. In the USA, the Prison Rape Elimination Act 2004, for example, does not 
directly apply to immigration detention, and it took until 2014 for the Department for 
Homeland Security to issue non-binding Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual 
Abuse and Assault in Confinement Facilities.209 According to a Freedom of Information request, 
there were almost 200 allegations of sexual abuse in immigration detention from 2007 to 2011, 
most of which concerned Texas.210 In 2014, a complaint brought by the Mexican American Legal 
Defence and Educational Fund (MALDEF) raised “serious allegations of substantial ongoing 
sexual abuse in the Karnes Center [Texas] in violation of [US] law”.211  The time it took, and the 
number of allegations and inquiries necessary to bring about change, illustrates the difficulties 
that reforms may face in countries such as the USA.  
 
Torture is not confined to adult asylum seekers and migrants. As found by the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, migrant children ‘have been tied up or gagged, beaten with sticks, 
burned with cigarettes and given electric shocks’, they also ‘have suffered from severe anxiety 
and mental harm after having witnessed sexual abuse and violence against other detainees.’212  
Detention Conditions 
Minimum standards of detention applicable in the human rights field, apply equally to 
immigration detention. Nonetheless, in practice, immigration detention is subject to less 
regulation and oversight and consequently the standards can be extremely poor. This applies to 
the building structures which can be makeshift or ad hoc; overcrowding; significant 
security/controls (despite that the detainee population have committed no crime); poor 
hygiene, nutrition and healthcare.213 Health facilities within immigration detention centres are 
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frequently not adequate to serve the multiple health needs of detainees, including to counter the 
risks of self-harm. In the UK, a woman miscarried her baby after inadequate treatment at Yarl’s 
Wood immigration detention facility. Reportedly she was “spoken to” because she was “refusing 
to wait her turn”.  Eventually, four hours later she was seen by a visiting midwife who called an 
ambulance.214 In another case, Muhammad Shukat suffered a heart attack at Colnbrook 
Immigration Removal Centre and died in July 2011, with an inquest finding that neglect by the 
private security company running the detention facility, i.e. the failure to call an ambulance, had 
contributed to his death.215 Even when detainees do access healthcare, there are reports of them 
being restrained with handcuffs216 and denied privacy.217 
 
 Use of solitary confinement, inadequate nutrition and healthcare, failing to separate 
immigration detainees from criminal detainees and not providing adequate facilities for 
unaccompanied children, have all been raised in relation to the USA.218 The UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants explains, in relation to Greece, that: 
 
Irregular migrants are detained up to several months in various 
establishments, such as police stations, border guard stations and coast 
guard facilities, which are clearly not suitable for long-term detention. 
There are also some dedicated migration detention centres, some of 
which are converted military camps or police academies. As common 
standards are not applied, the detention conditions and the safeguards 
available vary significantly in the different establishments and 
locations. The Special Rapporteur visited 11 detention facilities in 
Greece. In general, detention conditions at all [sic] were inappropriate. 
Migrants were locked in their cells for most of the day with no activities 
to keep them occupied. Several of the detention centres did not have 
fenced-in outdoor areas, thus police officers were reluctant to letting 
the migrants go outside at all, as they risk disciplinary action if a 
migrant escapes. The conditions at Venna detention centre were 
particularly poor, and the Special Rapporteur was pleased to hear that 
this centre closed down shortly after his visit. 
 
In some of the detention facilities, the migrants had limited access to 
toilets; some facilities had no artificial lighting so that during the 
winter, migrants were in the dark from early afternoon. Most of the 
detention facilities visited lacked heating and hot water and the 
detainees complained about insufficient amounts and poor quality of 
food, lack of soap and other hygiene products, as well as insufficient 
clothing, shoes and blankets.219  
 
Complaints concerning immigration detention 
It is next to impossible for individuals to challenge their placement in immigration detention, 
and even more so, their treatment inside detention. In practice, the systems put in place fuel the 
abuses. Some practices constituting or resulting in ill-treatment, such as potentially indefinite 
detention, may be understood to be lawful by the state in question. This can place a heavy onus 
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on asylum seekers and migrants to show in a given case that the system as it operates and 
impacts them personally, is unlawful. This is evident in the cases of F.K.G. et al v. Australia and 
M.M.M. v. Australia, in which the UN Human Rights Committee found that ‘The State party has 
not shown that its courts have the authority to make individualized rulings on the justification 
for each author’s detention during the lengthy proceedings involved.’220 
 
In some countries, there is no prompt or regular review of the legality of detention and the right 
to habeas corpus is often curtailed, particularly where detention is mandatory.221 Courts have 
also failed to address the individual circumstances of asylum seekers and migrants, sanctioning 
detention in a routine fashion.222 Even where it is in principle available, detainees often lack 
legal awareness and access to legal advice which would enable them to initiate proceedings.223 
 
Complaints procedures in place are often inadequate or complex and confusing. In one case 
concerning a sexual violence allegation, “Sana”, a 29 year-old Pakistani woman, who was 
detained at Yarl’s Wood IRC (managed by Serco Group plc), alleged that she had been sexually 
assaulted on three separate occasions between November 2010 and January 2011 by a 
healthcare professional employed by Serco.224 Her complaint was initially dealt with by Serco, 
which failed to refer the matter for independent investigation as required. The UK Border 
Agency Professional Standards Unit, which does not constitute an independent body, undertook 
another investigation into Sana’s case. After her case was eventually referred to Bedfordshire 
Police, the police undertook a “brief investigation” and reached a “definitive conclusion” to 
dismiss her allegations without having (i) considered all three of her separate allegations; (ii) 
interviewed the Serco officer who took her complaint at the outset; or (iii) sent an officer 
familiar with handling sexual assault cases (contrary to the police’s own “Policy for the 
Investigation of Rape and Serious Sexual Assaults”). The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 
subsequently found it difficult to understand “how the police found it possible to reach such a 
definitive conclusion after such a brief investigation” which appears to have been completed “in 
a matter of hours.”225  
 
The challenges that have been brought concerning the arbitrariness of detention have been few 
and piece-meal. In the UK, the Government from 2011 to 2014 ‘paid nearly £15 million in 
compensation following claims for unlawful detention’ in the immigration context.226 In several 
Australian cases, significant amounts of compensation were awarded for wrongful 
imprisonment or arbitrary detention.227 The Australian Human Rights Commission 
recommended payment of $450,000 in a case of prolonged arbitrary detention of a Turkish 
national with mental health issues who awaited deportation and a written apology.228 Abdul 
Amir Hamidi, an Iranian asylum seeker, who was repeatedly and racially vilified during the four 
years spent in immigration detention from 2000-2004, sued Australia for failing in its duty of 
care. The Australian Government eventually settled the case for an undisclosed amount and 
reportedly sued the private contractors operating the detention centres at the time, Global 
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Solutions Limited and Australasian Correctional Services, ‘for failing to protect it against 
lawsuits lodged by people kept in [immigration] detention facilities.’229 
 
The failure of procedures to effectively address complaints is reflected in the prevalence of self-
harm and riots in immigration detention centres. While these practices can be attributed to a 
number of factors, statements by asylum seekers and migrants alleging torture and other ill-
treatment indicate that ineffective complaints procedures have been one of the causes of their 
frustration. Australia amended its Border Forces Act in 2015, prohibiting health professionals 
who provide medical services in immigration detention settings from speaking out publicly 
about anything they witnessed in the course of their work.230 Failure to do so carries a 
punishment of up to two years imprisonment. In addition, an amendment under consideration 
in mid-2015 considered vesting officials with immunity for anything done in good faith.231 Such 
a provision, which has served as a means to enshrine impunity for torture in many of the 
repressive countries individuals seek refuge from, is clearly incompatible with a state’s 
obligations under international law unless it excludes serious human rights violations such as 
torture from its scope of application.232 
 
Torture and ill-treatment cases concerning refugees and migrants in detention have been 
exceedingly difficult to pursue. This is particularly so where they remain in detention and face 
the prospect of imminent removal or deportation. But it is also next to impossible for victims to 
pursue cases once they have been removed from the jurisdiction. Despite the challenges, in 
several cases claims have been pursued through national human rights bodies and before 
domestic courts, as well as through regional and international courts and treaty bodies where 
domestic remedies failed. Some individual cases have led to prosecutions, such as that of Edwin 
Rodriguez, a guard in a prison run by Management & Training Corporation (MTC), who was 
convicted for rape and sentenced to 14 months imprisonment in the USA though he was only 
suspended eight months after a complaint had been lodged.233 In Indonesia, ten detention 
centre employees were sentence to 10 months imprisonment for assault in relation to the 
beating to death of one Afghan detainee and the beating of three other detainees. 
Notwithstanding concerns over ill-treatment of detainees, the case did not result in any review 
or establishment of an effective complaints procedure.234 In the case of Velez Loor, which 
concerned a migrant who had been arbitrarily detained in Panama and subjected to torture, the 
Inter-American Court awarded $27,500 compensation, ordered rehabilitation measures, an 
investigation into the alleged acts of torture and various guarantees of non-repetition.235  
  
Detainees have also successfully pursued individual and class action cases against private 
contractors in the USA. Jesus Manuel Galindo, a Mexican national detained for illegally crossing 
the border at Reeves County Direction Centre run by Geo Group, died from an epileptic attack 
after being placed in solitary confinement as punishment for allegedly complaining about his 
medical condition. The lawsuit brought by his family was settled for an undisclosed amount.236 
In the case of Brown v. Esmor Correctional Services, a number of former immigrant detainees 
alleged they had been ”tortured, beaten, harassed and otherwise mistreated by Esmor guards 
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and that they were subjected to abysmal living conditions including inadequate sanitation, 
exercise and medical treatment”.237 They were awarded US $2.5million by the private company 
that ran the facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey.  
 
Private actors exercise elements of governmental authority where they are entrusted with 
security functions in detention settings, particularly where they are empowered to use force.238 
In Cabal and Bertran v. Australia, the UN Human Rights Committee underscored that a state  ‘is 
not relieved of its obligations under the Covenant when some of its functions are delegated to 
other autonomous organs.’239 Similarly, the UN Committee against Torture has determined that, 
‘where detention centres are privately owned or run, … personnel are acting in an official 
capacity on account of their responsibility for carrying out the State function without derogation 
of the obligation of State officials to monitor and take all effective measures to prevent torture 
and ill-treatment.’240 
 
The rulings, though only benefiting a limited number of persons, set important precedents. They 
show that both governments and private contractors can be liable, and that violations can result 
in significant costs for those responsible. However, this may still not result in broader systemic 
changes if damages are viewed, and absorbed as an inherent cost of “doing business”.  
 
IV.4.3 Removals 
 
Rejected asylum seekers are persons who are determined (whether appropriately or not) not to 
be in need of international protection and they are regularly subjected to removals. The 
rejection of an asylum claim and removal of a person who has a well-founded fear of 
persecution and/or who faces a real risk of torture or ill-treatment on return is contrary to the 
international prohibition of refoulement. Under the safe third country principle, asylum seekers 
can be returned to a country through which they travelled if it is understood to be a ‘safe-third 
country’. If that country is not ‘safe’, and/or the person faces a risk of onward refoulement from 
that country, this breaches the obligations of the country carrying out the initial removal.  
 
Removal and deportation powers form an important component of deterrence policies, 
signalling to any failed asylum seekers or other “irregular” migrant that they will not be able to 
remain in the destination country. Several states have therefore sought to expedite these 
processes.  Forcible and fast-tracked removals and deportations have led to a number of 
problems ranging from inadequate consideration of asylum claims resulting in denials of 
asylum and refoulement, and the use of excessive force including ill-treatment sometimes 
amounting to torture and resulting in injuries and death in some cases. The Council of Europe’s 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture has indicated in relation to removals by air in 
particular, that ‘such operations entail a manifest risk of inhuman and degrading treatment 
(during preparations for the deportation, during the actual flight or when the deportation is 
aborted).’241  
 
The UK case of Jimmy Mubenga illustrates some of the multiple problems with the 
implementation of forced removals. Mr. Mubenga, an Angolan national, had unsuccessfully 
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applied for asylum in the UK in the mid-1990s. While his and his wife’s application for indefinite 
leave to remain was pending, he was, in 2006, sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm, which resulted in a decision to deport him to Angola. On 12 
October 2010, three Detention and Custody Officers employed by the private company G4S 
escorted Mr. Mubenga to Heathrow Airport to board a plane to Angola. While on board the 
flight, a struggle ensued and Mr. Mubenga was held in a position in which his breathing was 
impeded, which led to his unlawful killing.242 
 
The coroner found a number of serious shortcomings. These included the fact that (i) G4S staff 
was allowed to carry out removals and use force without the required statutory accreditation; 
(ii) the system of paying contractors by results, i.e. successful removals, ‘carries with it the risk 
that removals will go ahead in circumstances where otherwise they might be aborted. Having a 
financial interest in getting the job done gives rise to real concerns that inappropriate methods 
might be used to that end’;243 (iii) there was evidence of ‘a more pervasive racism within G4S’;244 
(iv) there were multiple concerns regarding the use of force, including inadequate training, the 
use of “control and restraint” on an aircraft, bad practice (pushing a deportee’s head 
downwards), handcuffing to the rear and restraint/positional asphyxia; and (v) the failure to 
administer first aid. The report concluded by emphasising that ‘[u]ltimately, the Home Office 
carries responsibility for immigration law and policy and it is the Home Office that has ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring that any removals are carried out safely.’245 The Crown Prosecution 
Service, following the Inquest report, reversed its decision not to prosecute the three G4S staff 
involved for manslaughter. The subsequent trial ended in a jury acquittal in December 2014; the 
jury had not been informed of the inquest verdict of unlawful killing and the racist materials 
found on the accused.246 An appeal was later dismissed.247 
 
While the Mubenga case took place within a – flawed – legal framework, other states have 
resorted to particularly crude methods of expulsions that do not even retain the appearance of 
being in compliance with any law. In a case that eventually came before the UN Committee 
Against Torture and resulted in findings of a violation of article 16 of the Convention Against 
Torture, Morocco was found responsible for having abandoned around ‘40 migrants some of 
whom were severely injured, in the border area separating Morocco and Mauritania without 
adequate equipment and with minimal supplies of food and water, and forc[ing] them to walk 
some 50 kilometres through an area containing anti-personnel mines.’248 
 
In response to growing concerns about the excessive force in a number of countries, a number 
of standard setting bodies have elaborated guidelines or directives to limit the use of force in 
removals and deportations. For instance, Article 8 (4) of the EU returns directive provides that 
‘coercive measures shall be proportionate and not exceed reasonable force. They shall be 
implemented as provided for in national legislation in accordance with fundamental rights and 
with due respect for the dignity and physical integrity of the third-country national concerned.’ 
The Council of Europe has similarly recommended that states introduce ‘specific regulations 
which strictly forbid the following practices: […] the arbitrary or disproportionate use of 
force.’249 Similar principles are echoed in the EC Common Guidelines on security provisions for 
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joint removals by air,250 as well as in recommendations made by European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture.251 
 
Eurodac regulations requiring fingerprinting of persons arriving within the EU,252 when 
considered alongside the Dublin regulation has resulted in ill-treatment. Several reports and a 
study based on interviews with asylum seekers253 have highlighted the excessive use of force by 
personnel seeking to take fingerprints which may amount to ill-treatment.  Male asylum seekers 
reported they were beaten in front of their child (in Italy), had to undress and were lashed (in 
Bulgaria), were beaten with electroshock devices (in Hungary), and had to lie naked on the floor 
while being hit and kicked (in Slovakia) before their fingerprints were taken.254 In Bulgaria, 
asylum seekers who refused to be fingerprinted reported that they were threatened with 
further detention and subjected to ill-treatment in several cases; asylum seekers were warned 
not to complain about their treatment and threatened with various sanctions if they did.255 
While the regulations make clear that states are bound to apply them in accordance with their 
relevant human rights obligations, the regulations lack specific guidance on the use of force. 
Interviews with those alleging ill-treatment suggest that the individuals were deeply 
traumatised by their treatment and do not appear to have had access to effective complaints 
procedures and remedies.  
 
Some individuals have also been subjected to detention and torture on arrival in the countries 
from which they fled. In a number of cases, there is evidence that persons that have been 
refouled have subsequently experienced torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The later ill-treatment of deported/returned persons is not a 
condition precedent for determining whether a person was refouled (the test as the Committee 
Against Torture has made clear concerns the risk of such treatment; the fact that the treatment 
ultimately occurred is not necessary as such). Nevertheless, there are documented cases of 
torture and ill-treatment of returnees, when the risk of that treatment was sufficiently clear to 
the returning authorities. For instance, there are numerous reports of forced returnees to Sri 
Lanka being subjected to torture, including rape by security services.256 There are reports that 
Sudanese forcibly returned from Jordan were detained and some tortured. A young Sudanese 
activist who was kept incommunicado for 10 days said on his release, ‘They asked us many 
questions,’ ‘I cannot describe what they did to make us answer the questions.’257 
  
Complaints procedures concerning removals, the removal process and treatment suffered post-
return as well as remedies for such harms have been ineffective, largely because those affected 
are outside of the jurisdiction where the complaint needs to be filed and often in precarious 
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situations with little access to legal or other support. There should be a remedy for an unlawful 
removal which constitutes refoulement regardless of whether a person was ultimately tortured 
or ill-treated, however there is little evidence of such cases in practice. International monitoring 
bodies such as the UN Committee Against Torture have encouraged states to afford reparation, 
including compensation and rehabilitation to individuals who have been refouled, 258 and to 
carry out post-return monitoring,259 and to take steps to ensure the individual is not subjected 
to torture.260 Equally, and despite the recognition that restitution – to return the person to the 
status quo ante which preceded the violation - is the ultimate goal of reparation, there have 
been very few instances in which courts have ordered individuals who have been wrongfully 
refouled to be returned to the jurisdiction. Once out of the jurisdiction, it may be difficult for the 
returning state to have access to the individuals, particularly if they have been detained on 
arrival.  
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V. Global burden sharing 
 
The preamble to the 1951 Convention recognises that: ‘[t]he grant of asylum may place unduly 
heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the 
United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international co-operation.’ International cooperation to solve transnational and global 
problems is a common feature and primordial goal of the web of regional and international 
institutions which have proliferated over the last century. But has it worked? And specifically, 
has it worked to address the plight of refugees and the mass movements of people? 
 
International burden-sharing can help to fairly distribute refugee populations more evenly and 
not place the responsibility to host refugees simply on the country where they happen to arrive. 
But only ten countries host nearly 60 percent of the world’s refugees, and 86 percent of the 
world’s refugees are in developing regions of the world. The most developed countries have by 
and large shirked their responsibility to take their share of refugees, focusing their 
interventions on financial and material support. The UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion on 
International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations, 
agreed in 2004 aimed to encourage more effective and predictable responses to mass influx 
situations and to improve responsibility-sharing arrangements to share the burdens of first 
asylum countries. The 19 September 2016 draft Summit Declaration affirms states’ commitment 
to burden sharing:  ‘We underline the centrality of international cooperation to the refugee 
protection regime. We recognize the burdens that large movements of refugees place on 
national resources, especially in the case of developing countries. To address the needs of 
refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and 
responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees, while taking account of existing 
contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States.’261 
 
Burden sharing has become the lingua franca in diplomatic negotiations on refugee and 
migration solutions. But in the world of real politik led by national interests, global burden 
sharing has been characterised on the one hand by the growing pleas from those countries that 
host the majority of refugees to other countries to take up the challenge of resettlement, and on 
the other hand, by developed, mainly western states seeking to broker arrangements with and 
incentivising neighbouring states to better control their borders and prevent refugees from 
reaching Western borders. What chance is there for a more equitable reframing? Unlike the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which incorporates in Article 14 a right to seek asylum, 
the Refugee Convention does not recognise any right of entry for the purposes of seeking 
asylum other than through the back door of the corollary principle of non-refoulement.  
Amnesty International has gone so far as to term the G20’s burden sharing call as 
‘hypocritical’.262   
 
Burden sharing has been a common feature in Europe but is principally about restricting access. 
An example in point is the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016 which calls on refugees to 
be returned from Greece to Turkey, despite the huge refugee burden Turkey already sustains 
and the violence and human rights violations taking place in that country. Another example is 
the ‘Khartoum process’, an agreement between the EU and the Horn of Africa migration route 
states of Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia, agreed on 
the guise of thwarting trafficking and smuggling rings but clearly also aimed at curbing 
migration to Europe. The now almost collapsed Dublin system,263 another case in point, creates 
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a presumption that all EU Member States are equally safe countries for refugees and obliges 
refugees to apply for asylum in the first country of entry in the EU, which has placed a 
disproportionate responsibility on Italy, Greece and other countries at the EU’s external 
borders.264  Reforms to the system have been thwarted by other EU countries that benefit from 
the unequal burden sharing the system produces.  
 
Burden sharing has also been a common feature in Asia. The Comprehensive Plan of Action for 
Indochinese Refugees (CPA)265 provided temporary refuge for asylum-seekers from Viet Nam 
and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, reduced clandestine departures, expanded legal 
departure possibilities and introduced region-wide refugee status determination procedures 
which helped stem the flow of asylum-seekers. It also facilitated the recognition and subsequent 
resettlement of Vietnamese and Lao refugees. But the more recent Bali process - the Conference 
on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime,266 a forum for 
policy dialogue, information sharing and practical cooperation, has not led to any real burden-
sharing on the reception and integration of refugees. Australia too, has been ensconced in the 
negotiation of a series of bilateral treaties and protocols with neighbouring countries on the 
purported basis of burden-sharing, but principally to stem the flow of refugees to its borders by 
externalising its obligations.  
 
The problem with burden sharing, whether on the regional or international level, is that it only 
works if all states play their part. The moment some states refuse, this increases the burden on 
others and reduces the incentives for all. Burden sharing requires a high moral compass, it 
demands an international view which trumps national interests, and therein lies the challenge.  
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VI. Conclusions & Recommendations 
 
This Report demonstrates that refugees and other migrants experience torture and ill-
treatment at all stages of their “journey”. The laws and policies put in place by states to respond 
to the influx are mainly premised on deterrence as opposed to humanitarianism or respect for 
legal principles. By thwarting safer and legal modes of entry such as access to the destination 
country for the purpose of applying for asylum, these responses increase the resort to 
traffickers and smugglers and in the process heighten the risks that those seeking entry will be 
subjected to torture and related abuse.  
 
We call on States to adopt a more humane approach to refugees and migrants, and to stop 
pandering to the most xenophobic voices amongst their national constituencies. Racism and 
hate crimes should not form the basis of refugee and migration policies.  There are other voices 
that should be listened to, and these are being mobilised, though perhaps not fast enough. States 
have a crucial role to play in changing the rhetoric towards recognition of the human dignity of 
each person seeking and requiring protection. With the benefit of hindsight, states should be 
minded to reflect more on why the Refugee Convention was adopted in the first place.  
 
Burden sharing is a vital ingredient for responses to mass influxes however it can only work if 
states find ways to work collaboratively beyond what they perceive to be their own national 
interests and accept that a part of burden sharing is accepting resettlement. This requires a 
moral sea change, and a will to innovate. There are few great examples to draw upon; new 
solutions are needed and these must reflect the inalienable rights that each refugee and migrant 
possesses, including the right not to be refouled, including the right to be free from torture and 
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Rights are not and cannot be 
ignored in situations of mass influx; these situations are the precise moments when rights 
frameworks are most needed.   
 
The Report demonstrates the need to take the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment seriously 
in the laws, policies and practice of dealing with refugees and other migrants. This requires that 
immigration control measures are not part of exceptional regimes but are subject to the same 
standards of protection that apply generally, including preventive measures, particularly 
adequate safeguards and oversight, effective accountability mechanisms and victims’ rights to 
an effective remedy. States may no more torture a person at home, than abroad:  ‘As States bend 
the rules or hunt for the "gaps," attention must focus increasingly on those who are behind the 
policies and practices that impact on the security and well-being of others, as well as on those 
who implement them. This is not just a question of responsibility at the inter-State level, but 
concerns also that liability which attaches to individual agents of the State, to officials, to 
military commanders, to the members and crews of particular units or vessels.’267 States must 
be committed to sanction the refoulers, the torturers, the abusers and not only the smugglers 
and traffickers who make use of porous borders.  It cannot be OK to leave the most vulnerable 
victims of unimaginable atrocities in urban ‘jungles’ in Calais, barely floating boats at sea or 
insecure refugee camps in parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle East. It cannot be OK for children 
to grow up in deplorable conditions in camps, without opportunities for a future. It is time to 
reset the moral compass.   
 
 
Taking the prohibition of torture seriously also requires that states take responsibility and 
operate systems without outsourcing them to actors who are for various reasons not best 
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placed to provide the level of protection needed. A particular pressing area for reform is 
immigration detention. Such detention must be exceptional and alternatives provided. This 
would significantly reduce the risk of torture and ill-treatment. Finally, respect for the physical 
and mental integrity of asylum seekers cannot be divorced from the procedure of processing 
refugee claims. The perceived arbitrariness and lack of fairness of these procedures has caused 
great harm and contributed to resistance on the part of individuals concerned, which has in turn 
prompted the use of (at times excessive) force. Fair systems are therefore crucial to ensuring 
that refugees are recognised, and that no-one who has been tortured or ill-treated, or faces a 
risk of such treatment, will have to experience any treatment akin to this while looking for 
safety and protection. 
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